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False Persuasion, Superficial 
Heuristics, and the Power of 
Logical Form to Test the Integrity 
of Legal Argument 
 
Stephen M. Rice* 
 
“[A]rguments, like men, are often pretenders.” 
Plato1 
 
I. An Introduction to the Practical Problem of Illogic in Legal 
Argument 
 
Lawyers hold themselves out to be masters of persuasion 
but often fail to study two topics that are important to the art 
of legal advocacy: logic2 and psychology.3 These topics are not 
part of the mainstream law school curriculum. They are not 
required topics on any state’s bar examination. While there are 
justifications for the absence of these topics in the law school 
curriculum, this absence seems strange considering that 
lawyers study as specifically and intentionally as any other 
group in our society to offer and scrutinize arguments designed 
 
* Stephen M. Rice is an Associate Professor of Law, Liberty University 
School of Law. The author would like to thank Lindsay Leonard, Jared 
Williams, Brett Bloom, and Michael Minerva for their contributions in 
support of this Article. 
1. PLATO, Lysis, in THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUES 83, 110 *Benjamin Jowett 
trans., 2009) (c. 380 B.C.E.). 
2. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
827, 835 (1988) (“Formal logic is not taught in law schools and not found in 
judicial opinions, in briefs, or in law review articles.”). 
3. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be 
Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 437-439 (2008) (Observing that despite the 
need for understanding the role of psychology in the practice of law “law 
schools have tended to teach very little, directly, about how to be good with 
people, and current critiques of legal education do not focus much on the 
importance of psychological insights to attorneys.”) 
1
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to persuade hearers to accept an advocate’s preferred 
conclusion. Logic and psychology would seem natural—even 
essential—topics of study for one seeking to craft logical 
arguments and effectively deploy such arguments to the 
psychological predispositions of a judge or jury. Of course, the 
art and science of persuasion are not unique to the legal 
profession. Many who choose other vocations—journalists, 
physicians, drill sergeants, or financial planners—might find 
themselves having to communicate, diagnose, motivate, advise, 
or educate. All of these tasks involve some level of argument. 
Preachers, politicians, and salespeople are required more 
specifically to make arguments in their vocations, since they 
evangelize, debate, or market, so they also may benefit from 
more formal training in the theory and technique of 
persuasion. However, most would concede that lawyers are 
more regularly and specifically engaged in delivering 
arguments than any of these other professions. 
No vocation in society offers an experience quite like that 
of a lawyer, who, on the first day of a trial, neatly arranges his 
stack of exhibits in his banker’s boxes, reviews his opening 
statement, and watches twelve men and women—who know 
nothing about him, his client, his case, his motivation, his 
intentions, his plan, his worldview, his likes or dislikes—take 
their seats in the jury box. They are unfamiliar with his client, 
and may wonder why his client keeps looking at the woman 
sitting in the back of the courtroom, or what his client is 
writing on her yellow pad of paper. They are unfamiliar with 
the details of the case, beyond the limited facts revealed during 
voir dire. Similarly, they are equally unfamiliar with opposing 
counsel or her client. Instead, they sit in the jury box, 
distracted by thoughts of what is going on at home or at work. 
They are distracted by thoughts of whether they will get a 
lunch break, or whether they will get to ask questions of the 
witnesses or the lawyers. They wonder if they should raise a 
hand if they need to use the restroom. They look around 
wondering if the cameras behind the judge’s bench are on. They 
wonder what is going to happen next. They wonder who will 
speak first and what he or she will say. They wonder if they 
will agree with the plaintiff or the defendant, or neither. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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It is all very strange for everyone involved. However, 
resolving the strangeness and “making sense of it all” is an 
important part of litigation.4 In the end, whether the lawyer 
makes an effective argument regarding the disputed facts and 
law will depend—in the most abstract terms—on the two 
things that will likely answer the unspoken questions and 
confusion of the people in the courtroom: the convincing logic of 
the argument the lawyer presents and the jurors’ psychological 
response to the logical integrity of that argument. If the 
lawyer’s success or failure is a function of these two 
components, logic and psychology, it seems even stranger that 
lawyers receive no specific training in formal logic or 
psychology.5 
 
4. See Terry Lunsford & Beth Bonora, How Jurors Respond to Complex 
Commercial Cases, 98 GLASSER LEGAL WORKS 345, 348 (1998) (“[J]urors 
typically argue with each other over what the lawyers and experts said, what 
they meant, and what the implications are. Simulations and interviews 
make it clear that jurors spend most of their time arguing about the 
evidence—not the attorney's good looks or the witness's expensive tie. They 
do notice the witness's tie, as they notice everything in the court, and try to 
make sense of it. Some studies suggest that ‘extra-legal factors’ are more 
influential when evidence in the case is closely balanced. But jurors spend 
most of their time and energy discussing the witnesses' testimony, the 
lawyers' arguments, the documents, and what it all means.”) (emphasis 
added); Leonard Matheo & Lisa DeCaro, The Eleven Most Frequently-Asked 
Questions About Courtroom Presentation and Performance, 10 PRAC. 
LITIGATOR 17, 25 (1999) (“The theme of your case provides the jury with a 
viewpoint from which to examine all the evidence presented throughout the 
trial. It gives them something to keep repeating to themselves, to filter all the 
facts through, and to quote in the deliberation room.”); Jeffery P. Robinson, 
Opening Statements Become Opening Stories, 30 CHAMPION 18, 18 (2006) 
(“When they are good, our opening statements become a psychological filter—
the evidence introduced at trial passes through it, filtering out information 
that doesn't match the tune they have just heard in your opening statement, 
and emphasizing the information that resonates with your story.”); Alan 
Tuerkheimer, A Study in Juror Psychology: Making Up Minds Early and Not 
Keeping Them Open, 54 FOR THE DEF. 12, 12 (2012) (“At the core, when 
confronted with new, complex, and adversarial information, jurors need ways 
to make sense of it all since they have limited, short-term memories, as we all 
do.”). 
5. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon!, 43 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 623 (2008) (“Clinical and simulation work 
should guide students to think critically about the interplay of logic, 
psychology, and culture in a world in which interpretation is motivated by 
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As strange as all of this might be, there is another facet to 
the dynamic of courtroom argument that involves the 
relationship between logic and psychology. If lawyers are not 
specifically trained in these two disciplines, they certainly are 
not trained in the relationship between the two. Accordingly, 
when a lawyer presents his carefully crafted argument in the 
courtroom—even when his witnesses testify with credibility 
and his message is communicated with eloquence and clarity—
there is still a substantial risk that the jury will reject the 
argument. They will not reject it because they were skeptical of 
the witnesses’ credibility. They will not reject the argument 
because they found the lawyer confusing or ineloquent. They 
will not reject the argument because they were distracted by 
the lawyer’s client scribbling on her legal pad, the cameras in 
the courtroom, the break schedule, or the lunch menu. Instead, 
the jury may reject the argument because they were 
psychologically predisposed to ignore something lawyers 
frequently take for granted, the force of the argument’s logical 
appeal. 
Psychology teaches that logical argument, even when 
carefully understood and crafted by the arguer, can be 
misunderstood or ignored by readers or listeners.6 Moreover, 
 
6. For example: 
 
[S]yllogistic reasoning is prone to the “atmosphere effect,” 
where the overall atmosphere constructed by the premises 
in syllogisms influences participants’ responses. That is, 
participants produce a generic response when given generic 
premises, a universal response when given universal 
premises, and an existential response with existential 
premises. The data do not support this alternative. 
Participants produce more generic responses when given a 
universal first premise and a generic second premise than 
when given a generic first premise and a universal second 
premise, while the atmosphere effect would predict roughly 
equivalent proportions of such responses. Moreover, 
participants produce reliably fewer existential premises 
when given an existential first and second premise than 
when given any other type of second premise. The 
atmosphere effect has been unable to account for other 
phenomena in syllogistic reasoning, and is similarly unable 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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because of their psychological dispositions, readers and 
listeners sometimes accept arguments as persuasive even when 
those arguments are, incontrovertibly, logically invalid.7 
Readers and listeners are sometimes predisposed to accept 
arguments they read and hear simply because they take 
certain logical forms, even when those forms are 
incontrovertibly illogical and cannot support their purported 
conclusion.8 If psychological science has suggested that people 
are psychologically predisposed to accept arguments that have 
logically invalid forms, then it seems that lawyers should be 
particularly attentive to logical form. They should at least 
learn what logical form is. They should, at a minimum, arm 
 
to explain the results here. 
 
Sangeet Khemlani et al., Syllogistic Reasoning with Generic Premises: The 
Generic Overgeneralization Effect, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 4 (2008) (citations omitted); 
see also DEBORAH J. BENNETT, LOGIC MADE EASY; HOW TO KNOW WHEN 
LANGUAGE DECEIVES YOU 88 (2004). Psychologists have argued “if two 
premises are of the same logical form . . . then ‘atmosphere’ makes it likely 
that a conclusion of that form will be thought to follow.” N.E. Wetherick & 
K.J. Gilhooly, ‘Atmosphere’, Matching, and Logic in Syllogistic Reasoning, 14 
CURRENT PSYCHOL. 169, 170 (1995). However, if the premises are of different 
logical forms, two supplementary principles are required: (1) the Principle of 
Quality, which states that “whenever one or more of the premises is negative 
the preferred conclusion will be negative” and (2) the Principle of Quantity, 
which states that “whenever one or more of the premises is particular, the 
preferred conclusion will be particular.” JONATHAN ST.B. T. EVANS ET AL., 
HUMAN REASONING: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEDUCTION 235 (1993). An individual 
who has some grasp of logic often comes to think of the Atmosphere Effect as 
a shortcut to giving a correct response because it is often successful. Id. But it 
is not a sure-fire way to successfully conclude a syllogism. Id. In many 
studies, there is evidence of an attempt at logical processing. Id. at 236. 
Because the effects of atmosphere were more marked as invalid than valid 
syllogisms, there is a finding based on the assumption that the subjects are 
at least making an attempt at reasoning. Id. “The atmosphere of the premises 
has been shown to be a contributing factor to difficulties in syllogistic 
deduction . . . .” BENNETT, supra, note 6, at 88. While a complete survey of 
this area of psychology is beyond the scope of this Article, knowing that our 
psychology sometimes works against our ability to think logically should lead 
those committed to the discipline of legal reasoning to be that much more 
vigilant in understanding the logical form of the arguments we employ and 
refute. 
7. See supra note 6. 
8. See supra note 6. 
5
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themselves with the capacity to recognize logically invalid 
arguments, lest they too find themselves (or their audience) 
accepting a false argument due to psychological predisposition, 
rather than reasoned examination. 
Psychology reveals that the logic problem with argument is 
that recipients of arguments make logical mistakes, ignore 
logic altogether,9 or actually prefer certain illogical argument 
patterns.10 They make these mistakes, in part, because they 
employ “superficial heuristics.” Superficial heuristics are 
strategies people use based on the cues of an argument (often 
trivial in nature) that hint at the conclusions.11 People rely on 
these cues, manifested in the superficial, but incomplete details 
of an argument, like the phrasing of certain terms in the 
argument or the predictable elements of the argument.12 It is 
 
9. See Jonathan J. Koehler, Train Our Jurors, in HEURISTICS AND THE 
LAW 303-04 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds., 2006) (“Research in psychology 
with mock jurors, as well as anecdotal observation of actual jurors, suggests 
that jury verdicts may also reflect systematic biases that arise from the 
mental shortcuts—some of which may qualify as heuristics—that jurors use 
when trying to apply the relevant rules of law and logic to a target case.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
10. See Daniel Heussen et al., Raising Argument Strength Using 
Negative Evidence: A Constraint on Models of Induction, 39 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 1497, 1498 (2011). 
11. Bradley J. Morris & Christian D. Schunn, Rethinking Logical 
Reasoning Skills from A Strategy Perspective, in METHODS OF THOUGHT: 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REASONING STRATEGIES 31, 38 (Maxwell J. Roberts 
& Elizabeth J. Newton eds., 2005) (“Superficial heuristics are selective 
processing strategies in which solutions are derived from surface details, 
such as terms or common elements, rather than on content (as in knowledge-
based heuristics). Two well-known examples lead to matching biases and 
atmosphere effects. Superficial heuristics lead to selective processing, but 
differ from all previous strategies in that the focus is on the presence of 
surface elements; no specific content is accessed. They operate as follows: (1) 
surface structure is encoded; (2) key elements are identified; [and] (3) rules 
applied to them. For example, in the Wason selection task, subjects prefer to 
choose cards named in the rules rather than cards that are not named. Given 
‘If there is an odd number on one side, then there is a vowel on the other side’ 
the subject may focus on ‘odd number’ and ‘vowel’ as key elements. Then, 
when searching possible solutions, the subject will attend to those states that 
contain the key elements. Hence, a card with an odd number and a card with 
a vowel are selected because these match the elements in the rule. A similar 
processing model applies to the heuristics that lead to atmosphere effects.”) 
(citations omitted). 
12. For example, one particular kind of heuristic is discussed in Jeffery 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Philosophy, 43 TULSA L. REV. 865, 868-
69 (2008): 
 
Tversky and Kahneman presented people with a description 
of Linda: 
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She 
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply 
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, 
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
 
[Which is more probable?] 
. . . 
 
[1.] Linda is a bank teller. 
 
[2.] Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement. 
 
Deductive logic dictates that it must be more likely that 
Linda is a bank teller than that Linda is both a bank teller 
and active in the feminist movement because the latter is a 
subset of the former. And yet, most people presented with 
this question conclude that it more likely she is both a bank 
teller and active in the feminist movement. 
 
Just as departures from perfect memory allow researchers 
to make inferences about how the mnemonic system works, 
this departure from rational choice allows for an inference 
as to how people make judgments of this type. Tversky and 
Kahneman argued that this problem represents an example 
of how judgment departs from the ideal of rational choice. 
People rely on the feeling that Linda seems like she would 
be active in the feminist movement in making the judgment. 
The judgment, however, is not one that calls for a reliance 
on intuition; it is best made by the application of deductive 
logic. But Tversky and Kahneman show that people seem to 
rely on their feelings rather than logic. And in this case, 
their feelings lead them astray. They rely on what Tversky 
and Kahneman called the “representativeness heuristic,” 
which is founding probabilistic judgments on the apparent 
similarity between an instance and the general category, 
rather than on deductive logic. 
 
(footnotes omitted) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of 
7
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important to note that people rely on these heuristic cues 
rather than completely analyzing the entire form or content of 
the argument. Some heuristics can be important, helpful tools 
for legal decision making, since a comprehensive deductive 
process is frequently impracticable.13 However, they can also be 
problematic, causing legal decision-makers to abandon legal 
principles and careful logic in reaching legal decisions.14 
Accordingly, an important component of the legal process 
should be ensuring control over superficial heuristics.15 
 
and by Representation, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES 84, 92, 97 (1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment and 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124-25 (1974)); see also 
Timothy L. Hubbard, Logic and Reasoning, in 3 SALEM HEALTH: PSYCHOL. & 
MENTAL HEALTH 1121, 1124 (Nancy A. Piotrowski ed., 2010). 
13. See, e.g., Callia Piperides et al., Group Report: What is the Role of 
Heuristics in Litigation?, in HEURISITCS AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 343, 
371 (“[C]ognitive psychological theory and research indicates that as humans, 
individual legal decision makers have limited cognitive abilities, such as 
limited memory, attention, and processing capacity. These limitations are 
magnified in legal environments where legal decision makers often have to 
interpret complex laws, understand a lot of conflicting evidence, and work 
under time pressure. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that under 
these conditions, they will rely on simple heuristics to make decisions rather 
than perform complicated calculations.”). 
14. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Victoria A. Shaffer, Should We Use Decision 
Aids or Gut Feelings?, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 411, 412-
13; see also Koehler, supra note 9, at 303-04 (“Research in psychology with 
mock jurors, as well as anecdotal observations of actual jurors, suggests that 
jury verdicts may also reflect systematic biases that arise from the mental 
shortcuts—some of which may qualify as heuristics—that jurors use when 
trying to apply the relevant rules of law and logic to a target case.”) (footnote 
omitted). Dr. Koehler even goes so far as to suggest that jurors be trained to 
“employ elementary rules of logic and inference to make sense of the evidence 
and arguments that come before them.” Koehler, supra note 9, at 313. 
15 See Reid Hastie & Bernd Wittenbrink, Heuristics for Applying Laws to 
Facts, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 259, 275-76 (“American 
legal decisions occur within a context in which procedures are in place, 
specifically designed to make the decision process deliberative and controlled. 
For example, jurors are repeatedly admonished not to rely on intuitive 
judgment habits or to use cues such as the defendant’s race. They are 
prevented from hearing relevant (perhaps ‘best cue’) evidence such as 
information about a defendant’s record of past crimes. They are given careful 
instructions on presumptions and standards of proof. They are even given 
instructions on some inferences they should and should not draw. And, 
finally, they are instructed to consider alternative views on the verdict and 
group decision rules (e.g., super-majority and unanimity requirements) force 
them to pay special heed to unpopular views. All of these conditions are 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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One method of controlling superficial heuristics is 
emphasizing the important role of logical form in legal 
argument.16 If legal reasoning is to be a discipline, distinct from 
ordinary processes of decision-making and valued by society, 
then legal reasoning must be grounded in the integrity of 
logical form. If legal reasoning is to be grounded in logic, then 
lawyers must understand sound logical form and how it is 
applied in legal argument. One tool of philosophical logic is the 
logical fallacy. This Article will generally describe philosophical 
logic, logical form, and logical fallacy. Further, it will explain 
one specific logical fallacy—the Fallacy of Negative Premises—
as well as how courts have used the Fallacy of Negative 
Premises to evaluate legal arguments. Last, it will explain how 
lawyers, judges, and law students can use the Fallacy of 
Negative Premises to make and evaluate legal argument. 
 
II. Philosophical Logic, Logical Fallacies, and Why 
Understanding Logical Form is Essential to the Discipline of 
Legal Reasoning 
 
A. The Role of Logical Form in Reasoning 
 
Discussion of the philosophy of logic, logical form, 
syllogisms, or logical fallacies only rarely appears in legal 
arguments, briefs, or opinions. Logic has, in many circles, 
fallen on hard times.17 The role of formal logic in contemporary 
 
aimed to reduce legal decision makers’ reliance on solely heuristic judgment 
habits. But, of course, none of these measures are guaranteed to prevent fast 
and frugal decisions.”). 
16. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 9, at 310 (“[J]urors should not be free to 
reason according to their own unique brands of logic to obtain a desired result 
. . . . [P]rospective jurors who broadly fail to understand and accept the rules 
of logic and probability theory when applied to everyday matters have 
questionable reasoning skills. Because evidence presented at trial is 
increasingly complex and statistical in character (Feinberg 1989), the system 
should impose minimal standards to ensure that our legal fact finders are up 
to the task.”). 
17. For one perspective on the diminished role of logic in legal reasoning, 
see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943, 955-57 (1987) (describing historical perspectives on the role of 
logic in jurisprudence from Oliver Wendell Holmes’s admonition to “think 
9
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society stands in sharp contrast to its role in history. One 
example is early Puritan New England, where formal logic was 
of significant importance. The Puritans were a devoutly 
religious group that stressed the importance of a rational 
religion, viewing logic as important to addressing the religious 
issues of their time, and a topic to be studied, “even in one’s 
leisure.”18 The role of logic in Puritan culture had an impact on 
early American higher education. For example, the curriculum 
at Harvard College during the late seventeenth century reveals 
the importance of logic in higher education and the influence of 
the Puritan emphasis on philosophies of logic.19 The influence 
of the study of formal logic extended beyond Harvard College, 
and certain philosophies of logic were adopted by many 
preachers and educational leaders in colonial New England.20 
The importance of logic in these New England 
communities in the late seventeenth century provides a stark 
contrast to the role formal logic plays in modern times. Logic 
 
things[,] not words . . .” to the “rule skepticism” of the Legal Realist school 
and the view that legal decisions were based “on judges' ‘hunches,’ personal 
political views, or psychological dispositions” to Cardozo’s declaration that 
“[n]othing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There is an 
endless becoming.”) (footnotes omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
18. RICK KENNEDY, ARISTOTELIAN & CARTESIAN LOGIC AT HARVARD 6 
(1995) (“[L]ogic in the seventeenth century was meant to be used constantly 
and consciously as the technology of rational living. Logic was not simply a 
discipline set aside in the corner of one’s education . . . . Textbooks and 
manuals of logic in the seventeenth century were not arcane; they were 
designed to be useful and read even in one’s leisure.”). 
19. During the late seventeenth century, perhaps the most influential 
tutor at Harvard was the Puritan pastor and scholar William Brattle. See 
RICK KENNEDY, A HISTORY OF REASONABLENESS: TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY IN 
THE ART OF THINKING 217 (2004) (noting that in the late seventeenth century 
Harvard did not have professors, but instead used tutors who were “assigned 
a small group of students to whom [each tutor] taught all subjects for four 
years”). The influence of Brattle’s philosophy of logic was far-reaching and 
served to enforce the ideals of traditional Puritanism even after his death in 
1723. See KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 96. Brattle’s logic was religiously 
oriented and served the role of merging the instruction of logic with the 
instruction of divinity. See id. at 108. Brattle’s logic textbook became the 
most popular textbook at Harvard from 1687 until at least 1743, and possibly 
as late as 1767. Id. at 96. 
20. See DOUGLAS MCKNIGHT, SCHOOLING, THE PURITAN IMPERATIVE, AND 
THE MOLDING OF AN AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY: EDUCATION’S “ERRAND INTO 
THE WILDERNESS” 54 (2003). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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books do not make the New York Times best-seller list; formal 
logic is not a core subject of undergraduate education, and 
formal logic, as such, is rarely taught in law schools.21 Further, 
in the same way developments in the role of formal logic 
affected education in colonial America and beyond, the 
diminished role of formal logic in modern jurisprudence has 
had no small impact on contemporary American jurisprudence: 
 
Following Holmes and Dewey (and indeed also 
like Holmes, though, to be sure, much less like 
Dewey) many generations of jurists (especially 
the academic phalanx) have given no serious 
attention to the role of logic in legal argument, 
while at the same time, by word or by deed, 
dismissing it as a serious subject for teaching 
and analysis in law school. I suggest that this 
more or less universal dismissal has had the 
pernicious “trickle up” effect of dulling the 
precision and clarity and perspicacity of legal 
arguments offered by judges and lawyers, from 
those penned and printed by state court judges 
and lawyers to those issued by the United States 
Supreme Court . . . . Generations of post-
Holmesian legal academics and their students 
(many of whom have gone on to become lawyers 
and judges) have acquired the view, almost as an 
intellectual knee-jerk reflex, that deductive logic 
has very little useful role to play in legal 
argument. After all, no post-Holmesian post-
realist denies that a very great part of the law 
involves argument. But if “the life of the law” is 
not logic but at the same time does inescapably 
involve a great deal of argument, then mustn’t 
we conclude that “logic” has very little to do with, 
or anyway little of significance to do with legal 
argument? 22 
 
21. See Posner, supra note 2, as 835. 
22. Scott Brewer, On the Possibility of Necessity in Legal Argument: A 
11
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Nevertheless, logic continues to persevere, finding favor 
with judges interested in putting the power of logical form to 
work.23 One would be surprised to hear a judge admit to being 
convinced by an argument that is patently illogical. Few 
lawyers will advance such arguments, and few jurors will 
consciously accept them. Accordingly, having an understanding 
of formal logic can aid law students, lawyers, and judges in 
understanding the law, learning the law, solving legal 
problems, and making persuasive legal argument.24 
 
B. Defining Logical Form and Understanding Its Role in 
Advocacy 
 
Formal logic has been described in various ways.25 One fair 
 
Dilemma for Holmes and Dewey, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 9, 11, 25 (2000); see 
also id. at 47 (concluding “logic, including but not limited to deductive 
inference, is deeply and importantly relevant to legal argument and to the 
legal practices that are to a great extent comprised of or at least reliant on 
legal argument”). 
23. See, e.g., infra notes 76-79 (collecting opinions utilizing formal logic 
as part of the legal reasoning process). 
24. See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 22, at 11 (“[W]hile I do not believe that 
logic is the most important discipline a jurist (teacher, student, judge, 
scholar) should have, I do believe that it is a discipline whose competent 
mastery is vital for any jurist. In that way, Holmes’ and Dewey’s influence in 
this area should be regarded as pernicious.”); see also Ruggero J. Aldisert et 
al., Logic for Law Students: How to Think Like a Lawyer, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 
1, 2 (2007) (“First, all prospective lawyers should make themselves intimately 
familiar with the fundamentals of deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning, 
as Aristotle taught long ago, is based on the act of proving a conclusion by 
means of two other propositions. Perhaps 90 percent of legal issues can be 
resolved by deduction, so the importance of understanding this type of 
reasoning cannot be overstated.”). 
25. One description for formal logic is the “architecture of argument.” 
See generally James C. Raymond, The Architecture of Argument, 7 JUD. REV.: 
J. JUD. COMM’N NEW S. WALES 39 (2004). See also MADHUCCHANDA SEN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THINKING 25 (2010) (“Logic can be described as the 
systematic study of inferences. The British empiricist philosopher John Locke 
once said, ‘Logic is the anatomy of thought’. Formal logic is the study of the 
form of inferences or arguments, which enables us to judge whether an 
argument has a form that has been recognized as a form of proper inference, 
wherein the conclusion is derived from the premises following certain 
accepted rules or methods of inference.”). Philosophers have defined logic in 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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description is the philosophical study of proper inference.26 In 
argument generally, and in legal argument specifically, one 
party claims that his preferred conclusion is the proper 
inference to make from the law and the facts. Argument is an 
effort to justify a conclusion based on inference.27 In deductive 
argument, particularly, the arguer uses advocated, accepted, 
assumed, or undeniable premises as the starting point for the 
argument.28 From these premises, or from the relationship 
 
various ways, have debated what logic is, and described what makes logic 
“formal” or “informal.” For example, it has been said “[l]ogic, in its most 
extensive sense in which it has been thought advisable to employ the name, 
may be considered as the Science, and also as the Art, of Reasoning.” 
RICHARD WHATELY, ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 1 (1858). See also J. LACY O’BYRNE 
CROKE, LOGIC 3 (1906) (“Pure or Formal Logic is the science of the necessary 
laws of thought. It has thought rather than language for its adequate object-
matter; for though it must express itself in language, and is very much 
concerned with it, language comes in only as the minister of thought. It is a 
science;—a science rather than an art.”) (footnote omitted); W. R. BOYCE 
GIBSON, THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC 157 (1908) (“. . . Formal Logic is a 
propaedeutic which is abstractly concerned with consistency of reasoning 
without any reference to the truth or the falsehood of the accepted premises, 
or to the knowledge or the ignorance of the reasoner.”). “[F]ormal logic[] is 
devoted to thought in general and those universal forms and principles of 
thought which hold good everywhere, both in judging of reality and in 
weighing possibility, irrespective of any difference in the objects.” HERMANN 
LOTZE, 1 LOGIC IN THREE BOOKS OF THOUGHT, OF INVESTIGATION AND OF 
KNOWLEDGE 10-11 (Bernard Bosanquet trans., Clarendon Press 1888). 
26. See PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 31 (9th 
ed, 2006) (“A deductive argument is an argument in which the arguer claims 
that it is impossible for the conclusion to be false given that the premises are 
true.”) (emphasis omitted); see also WILLIAM J. KILGORE, AN INTRODUCTORY 
LOGIC 509 (2d ed. 1979) (“Deductive logic . . . is the analysis of arguments 
whose form requires that in all cases in which the conclusion is false at least 
one premise also is false.”) (emphasis omitted). In the context of legal proof it 
has been said that “[i]nference is the essence of proof; proof is good or bad 
according to the quality and number of inferences drawn from facts to 
conclusions.” J.S. COVINGTON, JR., THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT AND 
PROOF: CASES, MATERIALS, AND ANALYSES 2 (2d ed. 2006). 
27. DOUGLAS WALTON, ONE-SIDED ARGUMENTS: A DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS 
OF BIAS 28 (1999) (“[A]n argument is defined as a sequence of reasoning, a 
network of propositions in which some propositions, functioning as 
conclusions, are inferred from others, functioning as premises by means of 
inferences.”) (emphasis omitted). See also WILLIAM T. PARRY & EDWARD A. 
HACKER, ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC 5 (1991) (“An argument is a sequence of 
propositions that offers one or more propositions in the sequence as grounds 
or evidence for another proposition in the sequence.”) (emphasis omitted). 
28. Lawyers frequently argue regarding the truth of premises that fall 
13
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between two premises, the arguer seeks to reach a conclusion. 
The conclusion is not accepted solely because the premises are 
true; rather, the conclusion is accepted only because the 
premises are true and because the relationship between and 
among the premises and conclusion require that the conclusion 
be true.29 The conclusion is compelled by the premises only 
when the logical form of the argument requires that the 
conclusion be inferred from the premises.30 Such an inference is 
proper only when the form of the argument comports with six 
simple rules of formal logic.31 
Logicians describe this relationship between the premises 
and conclusion in terms of formal logic. Formal logic requires 
that, for a moment, one set aside the truth or falsity of the 
premises and focus instead on the logical form of the argument, 
to first discern whether if the premises are true, the conclusion 
must be true.32 This narrow focus on the logical form of an 
argument presents an important opportunity for a respondent, 
who may be restrained by stipulated, advocated, or presumed 
 
into the “advocated” category. However, legal argument is not always made 
in the context of disputed facts. For example, when parties stipulate to facts, 
when facts are admitted in pleadings or discovery, or where presumptions 
require that certain facts be accepted as true, the lawyers turn their advocacy 
skills away from arguing the facts that make up the argument’s premises and 
toward arguing the proper relationship and logical inference between and 
among the relevant premises. 
29. See JEROME E. BICKENBACH & JACQUELINE M. DAVIES, GOOD REASONS 
FOR BETTER ARGUMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SKILLS AND VALUES OF 
CRITICAL THINKING 237 (1997) (“When an argument is valid, if its premises 
are true then its conclusion must (necessarily) be true.”); TRUDY GOVIER, A 
PRACTICAL STUDY OF ARGUMENT 108 (2010) (“In formal logic, a sound 
argument is one in which all the premises are true and they provide logically 
conclusive support for the conclusion because they deductively entail it.”); 
HURLEY, supra note 26, at 43 (noting that “validity is something that is 
determined by the relationship between premises and conclusion” and further 
that “[t]he question is not whether the premises and conclusion are true and 
false, but whether the premises support the conclusion.”); see also sources 
cited supra note 26. 
30. See supra note 29. 
31. See IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 224 (13th 
ed. 2009). 
32. This presents an opportunity for the respondent, restrained by 
advocated, accepted, assumed, or undeniable premises, to still salvage a 
viable argument, not based in the law or the facts, but instead, based on the 
logical form of the argument the respondent is faced with. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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fact or other undeniable premises to still make a convincing 
argument. This argument would be one that rests not on the 
facts, or the law, but on the logical form of the argument faced 
by the respondent. In large part, this process is a function of 
two simple steps. First, it requires that arguments, which are 
normally articulated in nonstandard, casual, or even colloquial 
form,33 be arranged in a standardized, simplified form that 
allows us to distinguish the terms that are the subject of each 
premise, their relationship to one another, and their 
relationship to the conclusion. This standardized34 form is 
called a syllogism35: an argumentative structure made up of 
two distinct (but related) premises and a conclusion.36 There 
are three principal kinds of syllogisms: the categorical 
syllogism, the disjunctive syllogism, and the hypothetical 
syllogism.37 The disjunctive syllogism “contain[s] a compound, 
disjunctive (or alternative) premise asserting the truth of at 
least one of two alternatives, and a premise that asserts the 
falsity of one of those alternatives.”38 The hypothetical 
syllogism contains “one or more compound, hypothetical (or 
conditional) propositions, affirming that if one of its 
components (the antecedent) is true then the other of its 
components (the consequent) is true.”39 Since legal analysis 
 
33. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 267 (“In ordinary discourse the 
arguments we encounter rarely appear as neatly packaged, standard-form 
categorical syllogisms. So the syllogistic arguments that arise in everyday 
speech cannot always be readily tested. They can be tested, however, if we 
put them into standard form—and we can generally do that by reformulating 
their constituent propositions. The term syllogistic argument refers to any 
argument that either is a standard-form categorical syllogism or that can be 
reformulated as a standard-form categorical syllogism without any loss or 
change of meaning.”). 
34. “Now, to put an argument in syllogistic form is to strip it bare for 
logical inspection. We can then see where its weak points must lie, if it has 
any, and consider whether there is reason to believe that it is actually (i.e. 
materially) weak at those points.” F.C.S. SCHILLER, FORMAL LOGIC: A 
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEM 222 (1912). 
35. See id. 
36. See ALEXANDER BAIN, LOGIC: DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE 134 
(American Book Company 1841). 
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frequently involves placing legal labels on status or conduct, 
requiring categorization, many legal arguments fit neatly into 
a categorical syllogism. Accordingly, throughout this Article, 
“syllogism” will refer to a categorical syllogism.40 
Second, it requires that we test the form of this standard 
arrangement of premises and conclusion against a series of 
simple rules. These rules have been referred to as the rules of 
logic. The six41 rules of logic that apply to a categorical 
syllogism have been typically stated as follows: (a) avoid four 
terms (i.e., a categorical syllogism must contain three terms,42 
and the terms must have the same meaning each time they are 
used in the argument);43 (b) distribute44 the middle term45 in at 
 
40. However, other syllogistic forms have useful roles in legal argument. 
41. While these six rules are generally accepted in contemporary 
philosophy, not all logicians have agreed on the number of rules, or their 
precise formulation. Aristotle developed a set of six rules to check the validity 
of syllogisms. See Peter King & Stewart Shapiro, The History of Logic, in THE 
OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 496 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995). Richard 
Whately, a nineteenth century logician and theologian, also listed these six 
rules for the validity of syllogisms in his work Elements of Logic. See, e.g., 
C.L. HAMBLIN, FALLACIES 196 (1970). Whately’s six rules were deduced from 
an original twelve rules written in Latin by Henry Aldrich, a seventeenth 
century logician, who had expanded on Aristotle’s six original rules. See 
id. Logician C.L. Hamblin, suggested eliminating the first two rules since 
they merely define what a syllogism is, independent of the validity of a 
syllogism. Id. at 199. He also suggested combining rules five and six because 
they do not operate independently from each other. Id. These two rules can be 
joined to state “[t]here is an affirmative conclusion, a negative conclusion or 
no conclusion at all according as both premises are affirmative, or only one, or 
neither.” Id. Therefore, Hamblin uses only rules three, four, and the 
combined five and six to provide a satisfactory theory of the validity for 
syllogisms. Id.; see also HURLEY, supra note 26, at 256 (articulating five rules 
but noting “logicians of today generally settle on five or six [rules of 
syllogism]”) (footnote omitted). Hurley explains the distinction between five 
and six rules by stating, “[s]ome texts include a rule stating that the three 
terms of a categorical syllogism must be used in the same sense throughout 
the argument.” HURLEY, supra note 26, at 256 n.*. Hurley and others 
incorporate this rule into the definition of “categorical syllogism.” Id. 
42. In syllogistic logic, a “term” is a class of things that is the subject of a 
proposition. See B.P. BAIRAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SYLLOGISTIC LOGIC 283 
(2005). 
43. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244 (“A valid standard-form 
categorical syllogism must contain exactly three terms, each of which is used 
in the same sense throughout the argument.”). 
44. In logic, when a term is used in a way that “refers to all of the 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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least one premise (a discussion of the logical term “distribute” 
follows); (c) any term distributed in the conclusion must be 
distributed in the premises; (d) avoid two negative premises; (e) 
if either premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative; 
and (f) from two universal premises no particular conclusion 
may be drawn.46 
Understanding all of the rules of formal logic is a 
significant undertaking. It is ordinarily impractical for a busy 
lawyer to digest the long history of philosophical logic. 
Similarly, expecting lawyers to take time away from their 
practices to master the nuances of formal deductive logic, or 
even the intricacies of each of these rules of logic, might be 
unrealistic. Fortunately, extensive efforts are not necessary to 
realize practical value from these rules of logic. An 
understanding of even one of these six rules can be an 
important tool for a law student, lawyer, or judge. An 
argument that violates just one of these rules fails in its logical 
integrity and cannot support its conclusion.47 When the 
argument violates a rule of logic, it is labeled as committing a 
 
members of the class” referenced by that term, that term is said to be 
distributed. COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 245; see also NICHOLAS BUNNIN 
& JIYUAN YU, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 188 ( 
2004) (“A term is distributed if it refers to all members of the class to which it 
is referring and is explicitly or implicitly prefixed by a universal quantifier.”) 
(emphasis omitted); CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE, FALLACIES AND ARGUMENT 
APPRAISAL 45 (2007) (“A term is said to be ‘distributed’ in a proposition when 
it is meant to refer to all members of the class of things that proposition 
denotes.”); WHATELY, supra note 25, at 28 (noting that “a term is said to be 
‘distributed,’ when it is taken universally, so as to stand for everything it is 
capable of being applied to . . .”); JAMES A. WINANS & WILLIAM E. UTTERBACK, 
ARGUMENTATION 69 (1930) (“A term is said to be distributed if it refers to a 
class of things in its entirety.”). Conversely, if a term only refers to a portion 
of the members of the class, it is “undistributed.” WHATELY, supra note 25, at 
28 (noting that “a term is said to be . . . ‘undistributed,’ when it stands for a 
portion only of the things signified by it . . .”). 
45. The term that appears in both premises, but not the conclusion, is 
called the “middle term.” See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 225. 
46. See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244-49. However, compare 
Charles L. Hamblin’s discussion regarding historical variations on the rules 
of validity of syllogisms and his proposal that three concise rules, rather than 
six, could adequately encompass the requirements. See HAMBLIN, supra note 
41, at 196-202. 
47. COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244. 
17
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fallacy.48 Philosophy has developed a catalog of defective 
argument structures that can be easily identified by their 
argumentative patterns. These patterns, which manifest the 
violation of a rule of logic, are hallmarks of fallacious 
arguments. Accordingly, fallacy-based legal reasoning offers 
lawyers a shortcut to mastering philosophic logic: By learning 
to identify the patterns of argument, they obtain an important 
tool for testing the logical integrity of legal reasoning. 
 
C. The Logical Fallacy and Its Relationship to Logical Form 
 
If a violation of a rule of logic is a hallmark of a logical 
fallacy, then what is a logically fallacious legal argument, and 
why is labeling such arguments “fallacious” significant? A 
fallacy has been variously defined.49 However, most logicians 
 
48. See id. Formal logical fallacies are the result of errors in the required 
form of the argument. This is a contrast to informal fallacies, which are 
errors in the use of language. Id. at 119 (“Informal fallacies . . . arise from 
confusions concerning the content of the language used.”). 
49. See Hans Vilhelm Hansen, The Straw Thing of Fallacy Theory: The 
Standard Definition of ‘Fallacy’, 16 ARGUMENTATION 133 (2002), for a 
thorough discussion of the historical meaning of “fallacy” throughout the 
history of the philosophy of logic. Hansen considers a variety of definitions of 
fallacy: “A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle 
onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so[,]” id. at 133 
(quoting HAMBLIN, supra note 41, at 12); “errors in reasoning[,]” id. at 137 
(quoting MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND 
SCIENTIFIC METHOD 376 (1934)); “any kind of mistaken belief, however 
arrived at” generally or “an argument that seems to be sound without being 
so in fact,” id. at 138 (quoting MAX BLACK, CRITICAL THINKING 229-30 (1952)); 
 
[s]ophistical reasoning appears to be genuine reasoning but 
actually is fallacious. Sophistics, therefore, is that part of 
logic concerned with the defective syllogism. A sophistic 
argument is a syllogism that seems to infer a conclusion 
from probable premises but, because of one fallacy or 
another does not really do so. The defect in the argument 
occurs either on the part of matter alone or on the part of 
both matter and form[,] 
 
id. at 138 (quoting JOHN A. OESTERLE, LOGIC: THE ART OF DEFINING AND 
REASONING 253 (2d ed. 1963)); “[s]trictly speaking, the term ‘fallacy’ 
designates an unacceptable mode of reasoning. However, the term is usually 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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agree that an argument is formally fallacious when it violates a 
rule of logic.50 If it violates a rule of logic, the argument’s 
logical form cannot be relied upon to ensure the truth of the 
conclusion51—and if that is the case, there is no reason to 
accept the argument’s purported inference (i.e., that the 
conclusion is necessarily inferred from the premise). 
Understanding the relationship between the rules of logic 
and the important claim of deductive logic tells us something 
about why this label of “fallacy” is so important. Deductive 
argument is an important52 and common form of legal 
 
extended to include types of improper definition[,]” id. at 139 (quoting EDITH 
WATSON SCHIPPER & EDWARD SCHUH, A FIRST COURSE IN MODERN LOGIC 24 
(1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted); “any mistaken idea or false belief, 
like the ‘fallacy’ of believing that all men are honest. But logicians use the 
term in the narrower sense of an error in reasoning or in argument. A fallacy, 
as we shall use the term, is a type of incorrect argument[,]” id. at 139 
(quoting IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 52 (2d ed. 1961)); 
 
a synonym for any kind of position that is false or deceptive, 
and sometimes it is applied in a more narrow sense to a 
faulty process of reasoning or to tricky or specious 
persuasion [or] . . . a discussion [that] claims to conform to 
the rules of sound arguments but, in fact, fails to do so[,] 
 
id. at 141 (quoting WARD FEARNSIDE &WILLIAM HOLTHER, FALLACY: THE 
COUNTERFEIT OF ARGUMENT 3 (1959)); or “[a] fallacious argument in logic is an 
incorrect argument. It is also customary to restrict the word ‘fallacious’ to 
incorrect arguments which in certain contexts seem to some to be correct.” Id. 
at 141 (quoting JAMES D. CARNEY & RICHARD K. SCHEER, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
LOGIC 11 (2d ed. 1974)). 
50. See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244. 
51. See, e.g., id. at 244-49. 
52. Of course, there are other forms of legal argument. Deductive 
reasoning can be contrasted with inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning 
involves an argument that claims its conclusion is supported by its premises, 
but not necessarily required by them. When reasoning inductively, the arguer 
reasons from specific examples to support a claim that the specific represents 
a more general principle. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 26-28 (noting 
that “[i]nductive arguments make weaker claims than those made by 
deductive arguments”). Another common form or reasoning in legal argument 
is reasoning by analogy, a form of inductive reasoning. Analogy has been 
contrasted with deductive argument by one commentator this way: 
 
While analogies are thus useful in legal reasoning, they play 
a more limited role in legal argument. The obvious 
19
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reasoning.53 It is an argument that reasons that if the premises 
of the argument are true, the conclusion must be true.54 If an 
argument is deductively valid, then it is airtight as long as the 
premises are true.55 Accordingly, in cases in which a litigant 
can operate from premises that are assumed, stipulated, 
admitted, or presumed in the litigant’s favor (as they are, for 
example, where the facts as pled are required to be considered 
in the light most favorable to one litigant56), deductive 
 
inadequacy of the use of analogy in constructing a legal 
argument is an analogy’s inability to answer the question, 
“so what”? . . . It takes a syllogism to provide the answer to 
the “so what” challenge. That is, the logical force of an 
analogy comes from the syllogism to which it contributes, 
not from the persuasiveness of the analogy itself. Or, put 
another way, an analogy is a way of defending a premise of 
a syllogism; by itself, it is not an argument but merely a 
small piece of an argument. 
 
JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF 
EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 11 (1st ed. 1993). 
53. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Traversing Holmes’s Path Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Logical Form, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: 
THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 94, 120 (Steven J. Burton ed., 
2000) (“Judges constantly rely on deductive inference in the course of making 
and evaluating legal arguments. They often rely on it even in the course of 
deploying other argument types, such as analogy and induction. They also 
rely on it when applying authoritative rules about which there is no active 
doubt about the meaning of a term or phrase that appears in the rule, nor 
doubt about which, if any, authoritative rule applies.”). 
54. See supra note 26. 
55. ALAN HAUSMAN ET AL., LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY: A MODERN 
INTRODUCTION 5 (11th ed. 2010) (“The fundamental logical property of a 
deductively valid argument is this: If all its premises are true, then its 
conclusion must be true. In other words, an argument is valid if it is 
impossible for all its premises to be true and yet its conclusion be false. The 
truth of the premises of a valid argument guarantees the truth of its 
conclusion.”). 
56. One example is a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. See, e.g., Butler v. Ford Motor Co., 
724 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (D.S.C. 2010) (“Accordingly, a [Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure] . . . 12(b) (6) motion should only be granted if, after accepting all 
well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all 
reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it 
appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of 
his claim entitling him to relief.”) (citation omitted); see also F.T.C. v. 
Innovative Mktg., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384-85 (D. Md. 2009) (“When 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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argument can be an important argumentative strategy. The 
nature of deductive argument leverages the assumed, 
admitted, or presumed facts or established legal rules to the 
litigant’s maximum benefit; that is, where there is no basis for 
controverting legal premises (as is the case, for example, with 
facts that must be accepted in the light most favorable to one 
party), the success of the argument can be made to depend on 
the logical validity of the argument. 
One of the benefits of fallacy-based legal analysis is that it 
provides a framework for describing not only how the deductive 
argument works, but how the deductive argument fails.57 Since 
deductive arguments are vehicles for establishing a necessary 
conclusion, they present a powerful tool for advocacy. However, 
most lawyers are not trained in logic, so they are forced to 
attack deductive arguments with the only tool in which they 
are trained: raising doubts or disproving the truth of the 
premises of the deductive arguments they face. While attacking 
an argument’s premise is an important tool, relying exclusively 
on this method ignores an equally important element of 
deductive arguments: the argument’s logical form. Since the 
validity of a deductive argument’s form is determined by its 
strict adherence to the rules of logic, lawyers unfamiliar with 
the rules frequently miss an opportunity to completely defuse 
an argument’s reliability and persuasiveness. 
 
reviewing such challenges, courts construe the pleading requirements 
prescribed by [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] . . . 8 liberally and accept ‘all 
well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and draw[ ] all 
reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor.’ 
Traditionally, reviewing judges have operated under the oft-stated mantra 
that ‘a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”) (citations omitted). Another 
example is a pleaded fact in the context of a default judgment. See, e.g., 
Massa v. Jiffy Prods. Co., 240 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1957) (“This being a 
default judgment, the allegations of the cross-complaint are taken as true.”). 
57. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR 
LEGAL THINKING 2 (3d ed. 1997) (“Too often judges—like lawyers, law 
professors and law review writers—use the cop-out phrase, ‘flawed 
reasoning.’ This trite phrase means nothing. It does not indicate whether the 
criticism relates to the choice of a controlling legal precept, its interpretation, 
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Another benefit of fallacy-based legal analysis is that 
logical fallacies are an efficient methodology for explaining 
what is wrong with a legal argument. While the fallacies 
themselves are the work of centuries of philosophical analysis, 
they are well-established, enduring principles, the explanations 
and justification of which have been neatly encapsulated in a 
few simple rules. Additionally, as will be discussed in more 
detail below, these rules have been recognized by courts and 
used to analyze and reject fallacious legal arguments.58
 Accordingly, the logical fallacy is not only an effective tool, 
but also an efficient one. 
 
D. One Important Logical Fallacy: The Fallacy of Negative 
Premise 
 
If a legal argument violates even one rule, then the 
argument is logically invalid, and cannot be relied upon to 
ensure the truth of its conclusion.59 Accordingly, knowing just 
one of the six rules of logic can help a lawyer recognize one 
category of faulty reasoning, without having to master the 
entirety of the philosophy of formal logic. This task is further 
streamlined by the fact that where an argument violates a 
particular rule of logic, it receives a proper name. This Article 
focuses on the Fallacy of Negative Premises, which is the name 
given to an argument that violates the fifth rule of formal logic: 
“If either premise is negative, the conclusion must be 
negative.”60 
As discussed above, formal logic analyzes arguments in a 
basic, uniform, familiar argumentative structure: the 
syllogism. The syllogism is so natural to us that we rarely stop 
to think about why we seem to naturally gravitate to its form,61 
 
58. See discussion infra Part III. 
59. See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244-49. 
60. Id. at 247. See also MICHAEL F. GOODMAN, FIRST LOGIC 76 (1993) 
(noting that “if one premise in a categorical syllogism is Negative, then the 
conclusion must also be Negative, for the syllogism to be valid”); HURLEY, 
supra note 26, at 258 (“A negative premise requires a negative conclusion, 
and a negative conclusion requires a negative premise.”). 
61. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 224; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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or why it is so persuasive in legal argument.62 The syllogism is 
a simple form of argument that consists of two premises and a 
conclusion. Each premise is made up of two terms; the 
conclusion is also made up of two terms. For example, if 
someone told me that the judge who was about to hear his case 
had never taken the bar exam, I might respond by saying: “All 
lawyers must have taken and passed the bar exam. Judges are 
lawyers. Therefore, all judges have passed the bar exam.” It 
takes little work to organize this argument in the form of a 
syllogism: 
 
 All lawyers are people who have passed the bar  
 examination. 
 All judges are lawyers. 




BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 41 
(2008) (“[P]ersuasion is possible only because all human beings are born with 
a capacity for logical thought. It is something we all have in common . . . . If 
you have never studied logic, you may be surprised to learn—like the man 
who was astounded to discover that he had been speaking prose all his life—
that you have been using syllogistic reasoning all along.”). 
62. Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner suggest that lawyers 
“think syllogistically” and observe that “[t]he most rigorous form of logic, and 
hence the most persuasive, is [the basic form of formal logical analysis called] 
the syllogism.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 61, at 41; see also COVINGTON, 
supra note 26, at 199 (“The enticing thing about the syllogism is that it yields 
a necessary conclusion, which means that if the listener accepts the premises, 
then the listener must accept the conclusion or contradict himself. The early 
European intellectual prized the power of the syllogism to the point that 
much of medieval university training was about intricate points in 
disputation based on the syllogism.”); GARDNER, supra note 52, at 8 (“The 
power of syllogistic argument leads to the only significant rule about crafting 
legal arguments: every good legal argument is cast in the form of a 
syllogism.”). Courts have long recognized the syllogism as a legitimate and 
persuasive form of legal argument. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 421 (1991); 
Fort Stewart Sch. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 650 (1990); 
Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 443 (1959); Phelps Dodge Corp. 
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191 (1941); Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 
364, 370 (1925); William J. Moxley v. Hertz, 216 U.S. 344, 356 (1910); Pease 
v. Dwight, 47 U.S. 190, 200 (1848); Pace Elecs., Inc. v. Canon Computer Sys., 
213 F.3d 118, 123 (3d. Cir. 2000). 
23
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The argument has two premises and one conclusion. The 
first premise, called the “major premise,”63 contains two terms: 
“all lawyers” and “people who have passed the bar 
examination.”64 The term “all lawyers” is called the middle 
term.65 The term “people who have passed the bar 
examination” is called the major term.66 The second premise, 
called the “minor premise,” also contains two terms: “All 
 
63. The major premise is the premise containing the major term. The 
major term is the term that is the predicate of the conclusion. See COPI & 
COHEN, supra note 31, at 225. 
64. Because practical arguments are rarely made using strict syllogistic 
form, rarely express all of the terms of the argument, and rarely express the 
elements of argument using consistent terms, evaluation of logical form 
frequently requires taking an argument articulated in natural language, 
reducing it to its essential terms, and ordering it in a syllogistic form. As one 
logician has explained: 
 
Categorical syllogisms, as they occur in ordinary spoken and 
written expression, are seldom phrased according to the 
precise norms of the standard-form syllogism. Sometimes 
quantifiers, premises, or conclusions are left unexpressed, 
chains of syllogisms are strung together into single 
arguments, and terms are mixed together with their 
negations in a single argument. 
 
HURLEY, supra note 26, at 264. While syllogistic form might be an effective 
device for crafting and evaluating the logical form of argument, it is not 
always an effective device for communicating argument, and lawyers, trained 
toward brevity and efficiency in their argument, frequently speak and write 
arguments that do not readily expose their logical form. As one commentator 
observed more than 150 years ago: 
 
It has been remarked . . . that men are very impatient of 
tedious prolixity in Reasoning; and that the utmost 
brevity,—the most compressed statement of 
argumentation,—that is compatible with clearness, is 
always aimed at, and is indeed conducive to clearness. And 
hence, (as was pointed out) a single sentence,—or even a 
word—will often be a sufficient hint of an entire syllogism. 
 
RICHARD WHATELY, EASY LESSONS ON REASONING 109-10 (4th ed. 1847). 
65. The middle term is the term that occurs in both premises, but not 
the conclusion. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 225. 
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[people who are] judges” and “[people who are] lawyers.” The 
term “All [people who are] judges” is the minor term,67 and the 
term “all lawyers” is again called the middle term.68 Finally, 
the conclusion contains two terms: “all [people who are] judges” 
and “people who have passed the bar examination.” 
The Fallacy of Negative Premises focuses on the positive or 
negative relationship between the premises and the conclusion. 
The rule of logic at issue is the fifth: “If either premise is 
negative, the conclusion must be negative.”69 Accordingly, the 
issue of this fallacy only arises where a positive conclusion is 
purportedly derived from a negative premise.70 For example, 
consider the following example of a syllogism: 
 
My lawyer is not a thief. 
Thieves are not trustworthy. 
Therefore, my lawyer is trustworthy. 
 
In this case, the fifth rule of logic tells us something about why 
the logical form of the argument does not allow us to accept the 
conclusion. The reason for this is inherent in the nature of the 
syllogism and the limited inference that flows from a negative 
statement.71 A syllogism tells us something essential about the 
 
67. The minor term is the term that is the subject of the conclusion. See 
id. 
68. See supra note 65. 
69. COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 247. 
70. Id. at 247-48. 
71. One commentator has described it this way: 
 
This type of reasoning is unacceptable because of the 
difficulty in sustaining a factual proposition merely by 
negative evidence. When an advocate determines “there is 
no evidence that B is the case”; he or she is attempting to 
affirm or assume that non-B is the case. But all that is 
affirmed or assumed is that the advocate has found no 
evidence of non-B. The correct method of proceeding is to 
find affirmative evidence of non-B. This may be difficult, but 
it is absolutely necessary if logical order is to be preserved. 
To prove a negative is sometimes an impossible task. Not 
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relationship between its three terms. If the syllogism follows 
the rules of logic and if the major premise and the minor 
premise are both true, then the conclusion is true. We could not 
infer the conclusion from either the major premise alone or the 
minor premise alone. The power of the syllogism is its ability to 
ensure the validity of the conclusion based solely on the 
relationship between the major premise and minor premise.72 
The rules of logic police the integrity of these relationships. The 
fifth rule of logic, which requires that if a conclusion is positive, 
neither premise may be negative, simply reflects the limited 
inferences that can result from a negative premise. 
A positive premise tells us something valuable about the 
relationship between two terms, such as all As are Bs. A 
negative premise tells us something of more limited value, such 
as no As are Bs. The positive premise will assure us that some 
or all of the major term is also encompassed in the middle 
term. This is important information regarding the middle term. 
Further, since the middle term allows an inference in the 
conclusion about the relationship between the major term and 
minor term, a positive premise yields important information 
regarding the conclusion. Conversely, a negative premise will 
 
ALDISERT, supra note 57, at 156. Another authority states the reason for the 
rule in more technical terms: 
 
The logic behind Rule 4 may be seen as follows. If S, P, 
and M . . . designate the minor, major, and middle terms, an 
affirmative conclusion always states that the S class is 
contained either wholly or partially in the P class. The only 
way that such a conclusion can follow is if the S class is 
contained either wholly or partially in the M class, and the 
M class wholly in the P class. In other words, it follows only 
when both premises are affirmative. But if, for example, the 
S class is contained either wholly or partially in the M class, 
and the M class is separate either wholly or partially from 
the P class, such a conclusion will never follow. Thus, an 
affirmative conclusion cannot be drawn from negative 
premises. 
 
HURLEY, supra note 26, at 259. Notably, this example syllogism also violates 
another rule of logic, which prohibits both premises being negatives. See 
State v. Lackey discussed infra Part III, for a case example of this fallacy. 
72. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244-45. 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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only tell us something very small about the middle term, 
assuring us only that some or all of the major term is not a part 
of the middle term. 
This is sort of like being in a new city and asking someone 
for directions to the local coffee shop. If the person tells you, 
“Well, you don’t go down Rose Street,” or “You’ll never get there 
if you turn right at the stop light,” these statements are true, 
and they might even be important, but they tell you very little 
about the best way to get to the coffee shop. The rules of logic 
tell us that the conclusion must be a negative one, not a 
positive one. Stated otherwise, this fellow’s directions can lead 
you to conclude how not to get to the coffee shop, but they 
cannot lead you to conclude how to get to the coffee shop. 
Stated syllogistically: 
 
 All of the best routes to the coffee shop involve driving to  
 Water Street. 
 Driving southbound on Rose Street will not lead to Water  
 Street. 
 Therefore, driving southbound on Rose Street is not one of  
 the best routes to the coffee shop.73 
 
This syllogism, which has a negative minor premise, is valid, 
but it is limited to a negative (and not particularly helpful) 
conclusion. Compare it to the following fallacious syllogism. 
 
 All of the best routes to the coffee shop involve driving to  
 Water Street. 
 Driving southbound on Rose Street will not lead to Water  
 Street. 
 Therefore, driving northbound on Rose Street is one of the  
 
73. The structure of this syllogism could be simplified further to clarify 
its logical structure: 
  
 The best routes are the routes that lead to Water Street. 
 A route Southbound on Rose Street is not a route that leads to Water  
 Street. 
 Therefore, a route Southbound on Rose Street is not a best route. 
27
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 best routes to the coffee shop.74 
 
The conclusion is a bit more tempting, but logically unreliable. 
While the minor premise indeed assures us that if we were to 
drive southbound on Rose Street we would never reach the 
coffee shop, nothing assures us that the inverse would produce 
a different result. This is inherent in the limited value of a 
negative premise. It can only tell us what is not; it cannot 
reliably tell us what is. 
There is something subtly alluring about the logically 
invalid framework of this kind of illogical argument that makes 
us want to accept it, faulty reasoning and all. Psychology 
describes the problem in terms of heuristics and the 
“atmosphere hypothesis”: 
 
When quantifiers such as “all,” “some,” and 
“none” are used within syllogisms, additional 
errors in reasoning occur. People are more likely 
to accept positive conclusions to positive 
premises and negative conclusions to negative 
premises, negative conclusions if premises are 
mixed, a universal conclusion if premises are 
universal (all or none), a particular conclusion if 
premises are particular (some), and a particular 
conclusion if one premise is general and the other 
is particular. These observations led to the 
atmosphere hypothesis, which suggests that the 
quantifiers within the premises create an 
“atmosphere” predisposing subjects to accept as 
valid conclusions that use the same quantifiers.75 
 
 
74. The structure of this syllogism could be simplified further to clarify 
its logical structure: 
 
 The best routes are the routes that lead to Water Street. 
 A route southbound on Rose Street is not a route that leads to Water  
 Street. 
 Therefore, a route southbound on Rose Street is not the best route. 
75. Hubbard, supra note 12, at 1123 (emphasis added). 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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If people, particularly legal thinkers and decision-makers, are 
psychologically predisposed to “accept negative conclusions if 
premises are mixed,” then logical form and formal fallacies 
become very important and very practical concerns. 
 
III. Courts Have Recognized the Fallacy of Negative Premises 
as Fallacious Reasoning, and Rejected Such Arguments as 
Logically Invalid and Unreliable 
 
Of course, if logical form were not a real part of the fabric 
of American jurisprudence, the former discussion would have 
little relation to what lawyers and judges really do and would 
be difficult to apply to practical legal reasoning. However, 
logical form is an important part of our jurisprudence and 
logical form, and while important theoretically, it is also easily 
applied in legal argument. In fact, courts regularly evaluate 
logical form—often on a superficial basis, but sometimes in a 
more comprehensive fashion. In some cases courts even use the 
rules of logic, applying them in much the same fashion as a 
substantive legal rule and recognizing them as authoritative in 
evaluating legal argument. Courts have used the Fallacy of 
Negative Premises as well as the fallacies of Denying the 
Antecedent,76 Affirming the Consequent,77 the Fallacy of the 
 
76. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clark, 372 F. App'x 745, 747 (9th Cir. 2010); Arar 
v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 601 (2d Cir. 2009); Carver v. Lehman, 528 F.3d 
659, 671 (9th Cir. 2008), withdrawn, 540 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008); AGRI 
Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2008); E. Armata, Inc. v. 
Korea Commercial Bank of N.Y., 367 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2004); Tobey v. 
United States, 794 F. Supp. 2d 594, 601 (D. Md. 2011) (citing TorPharm, Inc. 
v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); Zortman v. 
J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (D. Minn. 2011); 
Optigen, LLC v. Int’l Genetics, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 n.10 (N.D.N.Y. 
2011); Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of Am., No. 05 CIV. 9050, 2010 WL 
3452374, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2010); Garcia v. United States, No. 08 Civ. 
4733, 2010 WL 1640224, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2010); Cusamano v. Sobek, 
604 F. Supp. 2d 416, 474 n.122 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 
631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 447 (D. Vt. 2009), rev'd, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010), 
aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. 
Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1132 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 
2009); N.W. Steel Erection Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 4:07-CV-3184, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4082, at *4 (D. Neb. Jan. 18, 2008); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
MFS Commc’ns Co., 901 F. Supp. 835, 849 (D. Del. 1995); Hellweg v. Comm’r 
29
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Undistributed Middle Term,78 and the Fallacy of the Illicit 
 
of Internal Revenue, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1261 (T.C. 2011); Villines v. Harris, 
11 S.W.3d 516, 520 n.2 (Ark. 2000); Thomson v. Beuchel, 2007 Cal. App. 
LEXIS 6242, at *18 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2007); Thompson v. Clarkson 
Power Flow, Inc., 254 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); French v. State, 362 
N.E.2d 834, 843 n.1 (Ind. 1977) (DeBruler, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Mark v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. A04-1905, 2005 WL 
1089016, at *1 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 10, 2005); Health Pers. v. Peterson, 
629 N.W.2d 132, 134 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Clifford, 121 P.3d 
489, 501 (Mont. 2005) (Nelson, J., concurring); State v. Wetzel, 114 P.3d 269, 
275-76 (Mont. 2005) (Leaphart, J., dissenting); Dep’t 56, Inc. v. Bloom, 720 
N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Iams v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 883 
N.E.2d 466, 478-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Edwards v. Riverdale Sch. Dist., 
188 P.3d 317, 321 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Hale v. Water Res. Dep’t, 55 P.3d 497, 
502 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2003) (Keasler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re 
Luna, 175 S.W.3d 315, 320 n.4 (Tex. App. 2004), withdrawn, In re Luna, 275 
S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App. 2008); Zinpro Corp. v. Ridenour, No. 07-96-0008-CV, 
1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3380, at *10 n.4 (Tex. App. Aug. 1, 1996); Manchester 
Oaks Homeowners Ass’n v. Batt, 732 S.E.2d 690, 699 (Va. 2012). See Stephen 
M. Rice, Conventional Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Denying the 
Antecedent as a Litigation Tool, 79 MISS. L.J. 669 (2010), for a discussion of 
the Denying the Antecedent and its treatment in case law. 
77. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Nev. Power Co., 488 F.3d 1189, 1196 n.7 (9th Cir. 
2007); In re Stewart Foods, Inc. v. Broecker, 64 F.3d 141, 145 n.3 (4th Cir. 
1995); United Tel. Co. of Carolinas, Inc. v. FCC, 559 F.2d 720, 725-26 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977); Toussaint v. Good, No. 3:05-CV-443-KRG-KAP, 2008 WL 2994768, 
at *2 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2008), aff'd, 335 F. App'x 158 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Topliff v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, No. 6:04-CV-0297 (GHL), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20533, at *183 (N.D.N.Y Mar. 22, 2007); Adams v. La.-Pac. Corp., 284 
F. Supp. 2d 331, 338 (W.D.N.C. 2003), rev’d in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded, 177 F. App’x 335 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Carlson, 67 M.J. 
693, 699 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2009); United States v. Balcarczyk, 52 M.J. 
809, 812 n.4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000); In re Jeffery, No.H031673, 2008 Cal. 
App. LEXIS 7976, at *25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Pirtle v. Cook, 956 S.W.2d 235, 
248 (Mo. 1997) (Price, Jr., J., dissenting); City of Green Ridge v. Kreisel, 25 
S.W.3d 559, 563 & n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 
572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Daniels v. Empty Eye, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 743, 752 
(Tex. App. 2012); Culton v. State, 95 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App. 2002). See 
Stephen M. Rice, Conventional Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Affirming 
the Consequent as a Litigation Tool, 14 BARRY L. REV. 1 (2010), for a 
discussion of the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent and its treatment in 
case law. 
78. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 578 (1967) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Allied 
Erecting & Dismantling, Co. v. USX Corp., 249 F.3d 191, 202 & n.1 (3d Cir. 
2001); Aylett v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560, 1569 (10th Cir. 
1995); Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1439 (9th Cir. 1988) (Aldisert, J., 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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Process.79 Accordingly, studying how courts have used the 
Fallacy of Negative Premises to decide cases is instructive. 
These illustrative cases provide authority for the application of 
this rule of logic to the process of legal reasoning. 
Recently, the Washington Court of Appeals utilized the 
Fallacy of Negative Premises in considering a motion to 
 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); McHugh v. Hillerich & Bradsby 
Co., No. C07-03677 JSW, 2010 WL 682339, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2010), 
aff'd, 413 F. App'x 240 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Regalado v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 
3634, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14902, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1999); British 
Steel PLC v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 426, 436 n.11 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996); 
Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 899 F. Supp. 1268, 1287 (D. 
Del. 1995); Foster v. McGrail, 844 F. Supp. 16, 21 (D. Mass. 1994); Pearson v. 
Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 782, 792 n.26 (N.D. Ill. 1986); United States v. Gambale, 
610 F. Supp. 1515, 1525 (D. Mass. 1985); Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 
595 F. Supp. 125, 130 n.4 (E.D. La. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 779 F.2d 
264 (5th Cir. 1985); Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 527 F. Supp. 632, 636 
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Lakeland Constr. Co. v. Operative Plasterers & Cement 
Masons Local No. 362, No. 79 C 3101, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11584, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1981); PPL Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 135 T.C. 
176, 186, 191 n.11 (T.C. 2010); Desilu Prods., Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1695 (T.C. 1965); Batty v. Ariz. State Dental Bd., 
112 P.2d 870, 873 (Ariz. 1941); Nickolas F. v. Super. Ct., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 208, 
222 n.17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 321 (Colo. 
2003); Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); 
Barham v. Richard, 692 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Star 
Enter., 691 So. 2d 1221, 1229 n.8 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Wein v. Carey, 362 
N.E.2d 587, 590-91 (N.Y. 1977); Hicks v. State, 241 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2007); Rushing v. Commonwealth, 726 S.E.2d 333, 338 n.2 (Va. 
2012); State v. Zespy, 723 P.2d 564, 570 n.1 (Wyo. 1986) (Urbigkit, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Stephen M. Rice, 
Indispensable Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle as 
a Litigation Tool, 43 AKRON L. REV. 79 (2010), for a discussion of the Fallacy 
of the Undistributed Middle and its treatment in case law. 
79. See, e.g., Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 295, 299 (1847); Walmsley 
v. City of Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 1989) (Aldisert, J., 
dissenting); Posey v. State, No. CACR 04-610, 2005 WL 1168401, at *2 (Ark. 
Ct. App. May 18, 2005); State v. Lackey, 208 P.3d 793, 797 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2009), rev’d, 286 P.3d 859 (Kan. 2012); Ochsner v. Idealife Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d 
128, 135 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (Kirby, J., dissenting); Bailey v. State, 294 A.2d 
123, 129 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); Council of Orgs. & Others for Educ. 
about Parochiaid v. Governor of Mich., 548 N.W.2d 909, 920 n.7 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1996) (O’Connell, J., dissenting). See generally In re Collom’s Estate, 28 
Pa. D. 503, 505 (Orph. 1919). See Stephen M. Rice, Indiscernible Logic: Using 
the Logical Fallacies of the Illicit Major Term and the Illicit Minor Term as 
Litigation Tools, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101 (2010), for a discussion of the 
Fallacies of Illicit Process (also known as the fallacies of the Illicit Major 
Term and Illicit Minor Term) and their treatment in case law. 
31
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suppress evidence.80 In State v. Weber, the defendant moved to 
suppress evidence obtained by the State after a Washington 
state trooper stopped the defendant.81 The trooper observed the 
defendant failing to stop before pulling into the street and 
speeding at 2:53 a.m.82 The trooper pulled over the defendant 
and administered a sobriety test, which the defendant failed.83 
Breath tests revealed the defendant was driving under the 
influence of alcohol.84 The trooper testified that while he is 
“always looking for DUI’s” he stopped the defendant for failing 
to stop and for exceeding the posted speed limit.85 The 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the 
stop, claiming the stop was a pretext.86 The trial court granted 
the motion,87 but the decision was subsequently reversed by the 
superior court.88 
The Washington Court of Appeals reviewed the findings of 
fact and scrutinized the basis for the trial court’s conclusion 
that the stop was a pretext to investigate whether the 
defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol: 
 
The trial court did not make any express 
statement about the trooper’s credibility, nor did 
it squarely find what motivated him to make the 
traffic stop. While we have an obligation to 
reasonably infer facts from the trial court’s 
judgment, it is difficult to determine what should 
be inferred here. Perhaps it could be inferred 
that the officer was motivated by something 
other than enforcing the speeding law, although 
there is not much in the record to support such 
 
80. See State v. Weber, 247 P.3d 782 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
81. Id. at 782. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 782-83. 
84. Id. at 783. 
85. Id. at 783-84 (emphasis omitted). 
86. Id. at 783. 
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an inference. To go any further and infer a 
specific motivation, however, fails on two 
accounts. First, nothing in the record would 
support such an inference, and a reviewing court 
must only infer facts that have substantial 
evidentiary support in the record. Second, it is 
a long-recognized logical fallacy to draw an 
affirmative conclusion from a negative 
premise. Thus, even if a reviewing court infers 
that the trial court factually found the trooper 
was not motivated to enforce the traffic law, it is 
not in a position to infer what the motive 
actually was.89 
 
The court went on to affirm the superior court’s reversal of the 
trial court’s order to suppress the evidence as being obtained 
from a pretextual stop.90 
In light of the discussion, supra, of the relationship 
between the fallacy and argumentative form, one might be 
surprised that the legal arguments here are never explicitly 
deconstructed into their basic logical form. This is one of 
practical benefits of the Fallacy of  
Negative Premises: It is simple to spot. It is evidence from a 
negative premise and a positive conclusion. Here, the fallacious 
pattern is evident without the need to deconstruct the 
argument into a strict syllogism. The court was considering 
whether the conclusion, “the trooper made a stop motivated by 
something other than enforcing a speeding law” could be 
supported by a premise like, “there is no evidence of the 
trooper’s actual motivation.”91 
 
89. Id. at 786-87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
90. Id. at 788. The court utilized the Fallacy of Negative Premises to 
explain why the superior court’s opinion reversing the trial court could not be 
based on a fallacious argument. It did so in the course of assuring itself of the 
logic of the superior court’s limited substantiation of its decision to reverse 
the trial court. The court of appeals went on to affirm the superior court’s 
reversal of the trial court’s decision that the stop was pretextual. Id. at 791. 
91. See id. at 786-87. 
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Next, in State v. Lackey,92 a court used the Fallacy of 
Negative Premises to evaluate an appellant’s claim that 
further DNA testing should have been conducted in his rape 
and murder trial. The appellant in this case was convicted of 
raping and murdering a young woman.93 The evidence used to 
prove the appellant’s guilt involved DNA testing.94 The DNA 
was consistent with the appellant’s, and he was found guilty of 
first-degree murder and rape.95 However, on appeal, the 
appellant claimed that further DNA testing should have been 
done on other evidence samples.96 The appellant based his 
argument in part on a Kansas statute that states that any 
person found guilty of murder may petition a court for further 
DNA testing.97 The court noted that this statute applied to any 
DNA testing that could produce “noncumulative, exculpatory 
evidence.”98 Because of this interpretation of the statute, the 
court found that the appellant’s motion should be denied due to 
the Fallacy of Negative Premises.99 
The court explained that the appellant used the fact that 
not all DNA samples were tested from the crime scene as a 
premise of his argument.100 It further stated specifically that 
the hairs were not tested from the victim’s body.101 Hence, 
those hairs should be tested. The appellant’s argument forms 
the following categorical syllogism: 
 
 “Not all DNA samples were tested [Major Premise]; 
 Hairs found on the victim’s body were not tested [Minor  
 Premise]; 
 Therefore, the hairs found on the victim’s body should be  
 
92. 208 P.3d 793 (Kan. App. 2009). 
93. Id. at 795. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 796. 
96. Id. at 797. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 798. 
99. Id. at 797-98. 
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 tested [Conclusion].”102 
 
The court recognized that the argument, as stated, is 
fallacious.103 The argument contains a negative premise; thus, 
no positive conclusion can be made.104 In this case, the 
appellant’s argument has two negative premises and an 
affirmative conclusion and is consequently guilty of the Fallacy 
of Exclusive Premises.105 
The court suggested that the appellant might have re-
formed an argument based on the Kansas statute to avoid the 
violation of a rule of logic.106 However, such a re-formed 
argument would have to be based on the positive premise that 
additional DNA testing would “produce noncumulative, 
exculpatory evidence” to logically support a positive 
conclusion.107 The court rejected this argument because the 
DNA testing would not produce exculpatory evidence. In other 
words, while such a restructured argument would take a 
logically valid form, the conclusion would fail because the court 
 
102. Id. 
103. Id. While the court is correct in recognizing that the syllogism 
cannot support a positive conclusion and that it commits the fallacy of the 
negative premise, the syllogism is otherwise deficient. The major premise 
contains two terms: “DNA samples” and “samples [that] were tested.” The 
minor premise contains two terms: “hairs found on the victim’s body” and 
“[samples] that were not tested.” The conclusion only references the two 
terms found in the minor premise: “hairs found on the victim’s body” and 
“[samples] that were not tested.” 
104. The court also recognized that the syllogism posed by the court 
contains two negative premises, which violates yet another rule of logic (i.e., 
that two negative premises are not allowed). This is known as the Fallacy of 
Exclusive Premises. See PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO 
LOGIC 266 (10th ed. 2008). See also NORMAN L. GEISLER & RONALD M. BROOKS, 
COME, LET US REASON: AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGICAL THINKING 41 (1990) (“If 
nothing from one group has anything in common with anything from another 
group, there is nothing you can say about the two groups in common. As 
Richard Rodgers’ popular song said, ‘Nothing comes from nothing: nothing 
ever could.’ This is often called the fallacy of ‘Exclusive Premises’ because the 
two negative premises exclude the possibility of any relation between them.”). 
105. Lackey, 208 P.3d at 797-98 (citing ALDISERT, supra note 57, at 145-
46).(“Lackey’s syllogistic argument violates both Rules 4 and 5 of categorical 
syllogism: it has two negative premises and an affirmative conclusion.”). 
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did not accept the truth of the required premise.108 
The Fallacy of Negative Premises was used in another case 
to reveal a logical fallacy in a legal conclusion and to teach a 
valuable lesson about statutory drafting. In City of Wichita v. 
Stevenson,109 the court was faced with the application of a 
simple city ordinance. The ordinance110 provided, in the 
applicable part, that “No person shall permit overcrowding or 
admittance of any person beyond the approved capacity of a 
building or a portion thereof.”111 The appellant was convicted of 
violating the ordinance on three occasions in 2009.112 She was 
present at a tavern called Harry & Ollie’s in Wichita, Kansas, 
on each of those three occasions.113 However, she argued that 
she was neither the owner nor a manager on duty on any of the 
three occasions for which she was charged, but merely a patron 
drinking and socializing in a tavern.114 Appellant’s legal 
 
108. Id. at 798-99. Logicians recognize a distinction between an 
argument that is logically “valid” and an argument that is “true.” Logical 
validity is a function of complying with rules of logic. If the rules are followed, 
then the argument’s form is valid. However, an argument’s valid form does 
not necessarily mean the conclusion is true. Truth (or falsity) is an attribute 
of the individual propositions that appear within an argument. Accordingly, 
the logical form of an argument is either valid or invalid; it is neither true nor 
false. Conversely, the premises of an argument are either true or false; they 
are neither valid nor invalid. These distinct concepts of truth and falsity, 
validity and invalidity, work together. When the logical form of an argument 
is valid, and its premises are true, then the argument requires that the 
conclusion be true. If either a premise is false, or the form is invalid, the 
conclusion cannot necessarily be true. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 
30-31. 
109. City of Wichita v. Stevenson, 265 P.3d 598 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
110. Id. at *1. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at *1-2. 
113. Id. at *1. 
114. Id. (“Stevenson argued the ordinance unconstitutionally failed to 
place limits on who police officers could cite for permitting overcrowding as 
evidenced by the fact that (1) she was not the owner of Harry & Ollie’s, (2) 
she was not the manager on duty on February 7, April 11, or April 18, 2009, 
and (3) although she was in the bar on all three occasions, it was only 
because she was socializing with friends.”); see also Brief of Appellant, at *2, 
City of Wichita v. Stevenson, 265 P.3d 598 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (No. 09 CR 
2601), 2010 WL 5626644 (“The defendant, Patricia Stevenson, was one of the 
managers of Harry and Ollies. Ms. Stevenson's daughter, Kristie McNeil, was 
the owner of the tavern. Ms. Stevenson ordinarily worked 30 hours a week, 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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argument on appeal was that the ordinance was 
unconstitutionally vague, since the term “no person” did not 
define who was responsible for ensuring compliance with the 
statute.115 
The court disagreed, ultimately holding that “[n]o person 
shall permit overcrowding” 
 
makes it clear that the individual who is culpable 
under the ordinance is the individual who 
actually permits the building to be over capacity. 
It is the responsibility of the police and fire 
departments to determine who permits, gives 
consent, authorizes, makes possible, or gives 
opportunity for the building to be occupied over 
capacity. The common and well-understood 
meaning of the word “permit” provides a clear 
standard for those who enforce the ordinance.116 
 
However, the dissenting judge would have held otherwise, 
and he justified his conclusion in terms of logical form, 
specifically, the Fallacy of Negative Premises: 
 
Subsection 15.01.480 of the Wichita City 
Ordinance states: “No person shall permit 
overcrowding or admittance of any person 
beyond the approved capacity of a building or a 
portion thereof.” Stevenson alleges that this 
subsection of the ordinance is unconstitutionally 
vague because the word “person” could mean 
“any human being.” And “person” is a term that 
can be applied without limitation. Stevenson is 
correct. For example, “[n]o person shall permit 
overcrowding” is a universal negative 
 
and worked only the day shift. Although she did not work the night shift, 
occasionally Ms. Stevenson met friends at Harry and Ollies in the evening, to 
drink and socialize.”) (citations omitted). 
115. Stevenson, 265 P.3d at *3. 
116. Id. at *5. 
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proposition: all persons are excluded from the 
class of things that allow overcrowding; and all 
members of the class of things that allow 
overcrowding are excluded from the class of 
persons. Thus, “[n]o person shall permit 
overcrowding” asserts that if anyone is a person, 
then he or she will not allow overcrowding. This 
negative premise can be reconstructed into the 
following syllogism: 
 
Major Premise: No person shall permit 
overcrowding. 
Minor Premise: The bartender is a 
person. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the bartender 
shall not allow overcrowding. 
 
By not explaining who is “no person,” the 
ordinance is deficient. Persons of common 
intelligence would be required to guess at the 
phrase’s meaning and differ as to how the 
regulations should be enforced. For example, the 
ordinance contains no guidelines to assist either 
a person who desires to know whether he or she 
is the person who is not to allow overcrowding or 
an official who is charged with the enforcement 
of the ordinance.117 
 
Judge Henry W. Green, Jr., wrote the dissenting opinion in 
City of Wichita v. Stevenson. He also wrote the majority opinion 
in State v. Lackey. While Judge Green does not provide an 
explanation of the Fallacy of Negative Premises in City of 
Wichita v. Stevenson, his recitation of this rule of logic from 
State v. Lackey is just as applicable here: “[I]f one premise is 
negative, the conclusion must be negative.”118 Accordingly, logic 
 
117. Id. at *5-6 (Green, J., dissenting). 
118. State v. Lackey, 208 P.3d 793, 797 (Kan. App. 2009). 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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precludes drawing a positive conclusion from a negative 
premise, such as “no person shall permit overcrowding.” 
Similarly, in the case of Ochsner v. Idealife Insurance 
Company,119 the dissenting judge pointed out how the appellate 
court committed the Fallacy of Negative Premises when it 
rendered its opinion. In Ochsner, the appellant, the surviving 
spouse of the insured, was attempting to compel the insured’s 
life insurance company to pay death benefits to the 
appellant.120 The insurer claimed that the insured had quit 
paying his policy premiums nine years before his death.121 As a 
result, the insurer cancelled the insured’s life insurance 
without giving notice to him.122 The court ruled that Louisiana 
statute provided that “No life insurer shall within one year 
after default in payment of any premium, . . . declare 
forfeited or lapsed any policy . . . [without giving the 
statutorily prescribed notice].”123 The insurer argued that it 
provided notice of cancellation to the insured’s bank, but not to 
the insured himself.124 However, the court held that the notice 
of cancellation sent to the bank did not meet the requirements 
of the statute.125 
The insurer focused on the “within one year” provision of 
the statute to argue that since the nonpayment of the premium 
extended beyond one year, no written notice was required.126 
The insurer argued that accordingly, after one year of 
nonpayment, “all life insurers shall declare the subject policy 
forfeited or lapsed” regardless of notice.127 The court accepted 
this argument. However, the dissenting judges evaluated the 
argument in terms of logical form and opined that such a 
 
119. 945 So. 2d 128 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
120. Id. at 129-30. 
121. Id. at 130. 
122. Id. The policy had been pledged to the insured’s bank, which later 
assigned its interest in the policy to an assignee. Id. The insurer also 
assigned and delegated its rights and obligations under the policy to another 
entity. Id. 
123. Id. at 135 (Kirby, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. at 131. 
125. Id. at 131. 
126. Id. at 132. 
127. Id. at 135 (Kirby, J., dissenting). 
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conclusion could not logically be drawn from the negative 
premise upon which the argument was based, since doing so 
would require one to draw an affirmative conclusion from a 
negative premise.128 Here, the dissenting opinion does not even 
arrange the argument into a syllogism. Instead, it simply relies 
on the simple rule of logic that one cannot reach any 
affirmative conclusion (All life insurance policies unpaid after a 
year must lapse) from a negative premise (“No life insurer shall 
within one year after default in payment of any premium . . . 
declare . . . lapsed any policy . . . [without giving the statutorily 
prescribed notice].”).129 
The Fallacy of Negative Premises was also an analytical 
tool in the dissent in Walmsley v. City of Philadelphia.130 In 
Walmsley, an expert witness in a police brutality case testified 
that a man died from multiple blows to the head.131 The 
plaintiff argued that the blows occurred as a result of police 
brutality, while the police claimed that the man died from 
blows received in a fight that occurred prior to any police 
confrontation.132 The parties agreed that prior to entering 
 
128. Id. 
129. Id. (emphasis omitted). The dissent evaluated logical form in the 
context of the rules of statutory construction: “When the language of the law 
can have multiple meanings La. C.C. art. 10 mandates us to give it the 
meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.” Id. at 136. 
130. Walmsley v. City of Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 1989). 
131. Id. at 547-48. 
132. Id. More specifically, expert testimony suggested: 
 
[T]hese injuries were almost certainly caused by multiple 
blows to the head with a blunt instrument. An expert also 
testified that it was the head/scalp injuries, rather than the 
facial injuries, which caused the brain swelling resulting in 
Thomas Walmsley's death. Although a toxicology report 
produced after the autopsy also disclosed lethal levels of 
barbiturates and diazepam in Thomas Walmsley's (“Tom”) 
body, an expert testified that in his opinion these drugs 
were not responsible for the brain swelling that caused 
Tom's death. That expert also testified that it was unlikely 
Tom's injuries could have resulted from a fall, resulting in 
contact with a wall or rock, or from a fistfight, due to their 
severity, location, and the lack of external abrasions. He 
opined that it was possible the injuries were the result of 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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police custody, the deceased had been in a fight with his 
brother, and that near the end of the fight the deceased was 
struck two or three times in the face.133 Sometime after the 
fight, police arrived and took the deceased into custody. While 
the police were transporting him to the police station, the 
deceased lost consciousness and died.134 The deceased’s family 
claimed that before the police confrontation, they had an 
opportunity to observe the deceased, brushed his hair back 
from his face, and saw no lumps on his head.135 Afterwards, 
however, lumps were visible.136 The plaintiff argued that since 
the witnesses observed no lumps before the police 
confrontation, but observed them after, the lumps must not 
have been caused by the fight that preceded the 
confrontation.137 
The court found that this testimony was enough evidence 
for a jury to reasonably infer that the police caused the man’s 
death. Further, sufficient circumstantial evidence was given by 
the plaintiff to permit a jury to conclude that the man had been 
involved with the police when he received the injuries. The 
dissenting judge, Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert,138 argued that 
because no direct evidence was presented, the court should not 
have ruled that the police could have caused the injuries.139 He 
explained that the court gave too much weight to the family’s 
claim that no lumps were observed on the deceased’s head 
 
being clubbed with a nightstick. 
 
Id. at 548 (citations omitted). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 550. 
135. Id. at 550-51. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 554 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). 
138. The dissenting judge is Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Judge for 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by 
designation. Judge Aldisert has written several opinions discussing logic in 
legal argument. He is the author of other works specifically addressing 
formal logic in legal reasoning, including Logic for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear 
Legal Thinking and Logic For Law Students: How To Think Like A Lawyer in 
addition to several other books focusing on the judicial process. 
139. Walmsley, 872 F.2d at 553. 
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before he was in police custody.140 Judge Aldisert observed that 
this was particularly true in light of the fact that there was no 
evidence that the family members looked for lumps on the 
deceased’s head after the fight with his brother.141 From this, 
an inference was drawn that there were no bumps on the head 
before the confrontation, but such an inference was 
inappropriate in these circumstances.142 Accordingly, Judge 
Aldisert would have held that the appellant’s argument 
committed the Fallacy of Negative Premises and should have 
been rejected by the court.143 
Judge Aldisert succinctly identified what is wrong with 
this fallacious pattern of reasoning: 
 
This type of reasoning is unacceptable because of 
the difficulty in sustaining a factual proposition 
merely by negative evidence. When an advocate 
determines that there is no evidence that B 
(bumps on the head) is the case; he or she is 
attempting to affirm or assume that non-B is the 
case. But all that is affirmed or assumed is that 
the advocate has found no evidence of non-B. The 
correct method of proceeding is to find 
affirmative evidence of non-B. This may be 
difficult, but it is absolutely necessary if logical 
order is to be preserved. To prove a negative is 
sometimes an impossible task. Not knowing that 
something exists is simply not knowing. 
Similarly, not knowing that Walmsley hit his 
head during the fight with his brother does not 
imply that he did or did not hit his head.144 
 
In Kolakowski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
the Fallacy of Negative Premises was utilized again by a court 
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evaluating a claimant’s argument.145 However, in this case one 
might take issue with how the court implemented the rule of 
logic. In Kolakowski, the plaintiffs filed a petition for 
compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act 
of 1986.146 They alleged that their son had died as a result of 
the Thimerosal contained in two Hepatitis B vaccinations.147 
One of the issues in the case involved the impact of a “safety 
reference dose” on the claimants’ argument.148 The court 
critiqued the claimants’ argument in terms of formal logic, 
specifically, the Fallacy of Negative Premises: 
 
A large point of confusion, that apparently 
confused Petitioners in their brief, concerns the 
safety reference dose. This dose is an amount of 
the substance which, if no more than that 
amount is consumed daily (on average), adverse 
outcomes are all but certain to be avoided. In 
every instance, it assumes a value from the most 
sensitive data points recorded, and adds orders of 
magnitude whenever there is an ambiguity. 
Suffice it to say that it is a logical fallacy 
(“affirmative conclusion from a negative 
premise”) to use the following statement: “IF the 
reference dose of methyl mercury is not exceeded 
in average daily consumption, THEN no adverse 
outcomes will result,” in order to conclude 
through reformulation that “IF an amount of 
ethyl mercury over the reference dose of methyl 
mercury is consumed on two separate days of a 
series, but not every day or in very large 
amounts, THEN adverse outcomes will result.”149 
 
145. Kolakowski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs, No. 99-0625V, 2010 
WL 5672753, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 23, 2010). 
146. Id. at *1. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at *132-33. 
149. Id. at 133. Notably, the court went on to explain this line of 
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The court here reduces the plaintiff’s argument to the following 
syllogism: 
 
 “If the reference dose of methyl mercury is not exceeded in  
 average daily consumption, then no adverse outcomes will  
 result.”150 
 
Aside from this obvious fallacy, there is also present in that 
formulation the “quantifier-shift fallacy” of attributing to 
ethyl mercury the precise characteristics of methyl mercury, 
mercury chloride, or elemental mercury: Even if ethyl 
mercury is a form of mercury (which in some dosage is toxic 
or lethal, depending on its form), and shares characteristics 
with all forms of mercury (most of all methyl mercury as 
another organomercurial), it does not logically follow, as a 
deductive exercise, that ethyl mercury shares every 
characteristic of the others. If it does not, then part of 
proving that ethyl mercury damages infants would include 
an inductive course of determining exactly what ethyl 
mercury is capable of, and its precise characteristics as a 
substance. It is improper even to begin from the same 
reference dose as methyl mercury, for that matter. Dr. 
Lucier subjectively weighed attributes that are 
qualitatively, not just quantitatively, distinct, in order to 
arrive at his judgment that ethyl mercury is just as toxic as 
methyl mercury. The Court does not accept such a premise 
as proven, without some objective standard to assess his 
balancing of toxicity factors. Moreover, that opinion is not 
corroborated by the medical literature filed in this case. Dr. 
Lucier admitted as much when he said that regulatory 
agencies, in the interest of efficiency, will study chemical 
groups instead of individual chemicals, and their practice in 
doing so is to pick the most toxic of the group to study, and 
assign a reference dose. Noticeably, not one of the 
regulatory agencies discussed herein ever thought to study 
ethyl mercury for this purpose instead of methyl mercury. 
Despite this, Dr. Lucier's opinion concerning the toxicity of 
ethyl mercury in thimerosal was based throughout on the 
supposition either that ethyl mercury was the same as 
methyl mercury, or that it was even more toxic. 
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 The reference dose of methyl mercury was exceeded in  
 average daily consumption. 
 Therefore, adverse outcomes will result.151 
 
The court’s syllogism takes the form of a hypothetical 
syllogism,152 rather than the categorical syllogism153 described 
above. Since the Fallacy of Negative Premises results from the 
violation of one of the rules of categorical syllogisms,154 one 
could be critical of the court’s application of this syllogistic rule 
to the argument as articulated by the court.155 
Nonetheless, the court appears to have arrived at a correct 
conclusion, criticizing the logical form of the syllogism. The 
syllogism described by the court appears to commit another 
formal fallacy, the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent. This 
fallacy results from violating the rule required of hypothetical 
syllogisms. The rule has been summarized this way: “A valid 
hypothetical syllogism either denies the consequent . . . or 
affirms the antecedent . . . of the major premise; it doesn’t deny 
the antecedent or affirm the consequent.”156 Since the 
hypothetical syllogism described by the court denies the 
antecedent term, it cannot support its conclusion.157 
 
151. See id. 
152. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
153. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. 
154. The five syllogistic rules, including the rule that requires that if 
either premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative, apply only to 
standard-form categorical syllogism. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 
249. 
155. Of course, the syllogism does include a negative premise. The 
syllogism might be reduced to symbols and considered this way: 
 
 If A, then B. 
 Not A. 
 Therefore, not B. 
 
The premise “the reference dose of methyl mercury was exceeded in average 
daily consumption” (symbolized as “not A” in the syllogism above) is a 
negation of the term “the reference dose of methyl mercury is not exceeded in 
average daily consumption” (“if A” in the syllogism above). 
156. GEISLER & BROOKS, supra note 104, at 65. 
157. See Rice, supra note 76, for an article describing the Fallacy of 
45
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Even if the argument is couched in terms of a categorical 
syllogism, it in fact commits the Fallacy of Negative Premise. 
Hypothetical syllogisms can be “reduced” or converted to 
categorical syllogisms.158 For example, the syllogism at issue in 
the lawsuit could be formed as follows: 
 
 All reference doses of methyl mercury within the  
 average daily consumption are not doses that will  
 produce adverse outcomes. 
 The reference dose of methyl mercury at issue in  
 this case was not a dose of methyl mercury within  
 the average daily consumption. 
 Therefore, the reference dose of methyl mercury at  
 issue in this case is a dose that will produce adverse  
 outcomes.159 
 
Since both the major and minor premises contain a negative 
term, the court was correct in recognizing that the argument 





Denying the Antecedent and illustrating its application by courts. 
158. “The authority of the rules operative in the hypothetical syllogism 
is found in the more extensive and fundamental legislation of the categorical 
syllogism . . . . To see this we need only to lift the ‘if’ out of the more flexible 
syllogism and put our argument into firmer [categorical] form.” CHARLES 
GRAY SHAW, LOGIC IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 172 (1935). See also JOHN 
LEECHMAN, LOGIC: DESIGNED AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REASONING 
86-87 (1864) (providing more detailed instruction on reducing hypothetical 
syllogisms to categorical syllogisms). 
159. Reduced to symbols for clarity, the syllogism can be stated: 
 
 All As are not Bs. 
 All Cs are not As. 
 Therefore, all Cs are Bs. 
 
“A” is equivalent to “reference doses of methyl mercury within the average 
daily consumption.” “B” is equivalent to “dose[s] that will produce adverse 
outcomes.” “C” is equivalent to “the reference dose of methyl mercury at issue 
in this case.” 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3
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IV. Recognizing the Fallacy of Negative Premise and Using it 
to Defeat Fallacious Reasoning 
 
After considering these examples and authorities, a 
pattern emerges that demystifies the Fallacy of Negative 
Premises as it commonly appears in legal argumentation. The 
pattern mirrors the rule of logic requiring that a negative 
premise cannot yield a positive conclusion. Some patterns will 
meet the requirements of this rule: a negative premise and a 
negative conclusion; a positive premise and a positive 
conclusion. One pattern will not meet the requirements of this 
rule: a negative premise and a positive conclusion. 
Of course, the fact that the argument passes one rule does 
not necessarily mean that the argument is logically sound, 
since there are four or five other rules that it must comply 
with.160 However, this is one of the benefits of fallacy-based 
legal reasoning. Lawyers are not always busy making perfect 
arguments. Frequently, the role of a judge or lawyer is to spot 
bad arguments. Spotting a bad argument can be as simple as 
understanding that the argument fails one rule of logic. So, 
fallacy-based legal reasoning is the process of using one’s 
knowledge of the patterns of fallacious logical form to spot an 
invalid argument and explain why it is invalid. The process 
begins with being attentive to arguments that fit the patterns 
of invalid logical form—like, for example, the Fallacy of 




No contract to perform an illegal act is enforceable; or 
Laypersons are not competent to testify as expert  
witnesses; or 
Gratuitous promises are not enforceable under the doctrine  
of consideration. 
 
Once a negative premise is spotted, examining the 
 
160. See supra note 41. 
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argument can test the conclusion. In order to comport with this 
rule of logic, it must be stated in the negative. A positive 
conclusion will fail the test, and the argument is not reliable. 
For example: 
 
 No fugitive from justice is eligible to obtain a concealed- 
 weapon permit. 
 The plaintiff is not a fugitive from justice. 
 Plaintiff is eligible to apply for a concealed-weapon permit. 
 
 No contract to perform an illegal act is enforceable. 
 The contract at issue in this litigation concerns a legal act. 
 Therefore, the contract at issue in this litigation is  
 enforceable. 
 
 Laypersons are not competent to testify as expert  
 witnesses. 
 Mr. Flashburger is a layperson. 
 Therefore, Mr. Flashburger is competent to testify as a fact  
 witness. 
 
 Gratuitous promises are not enforceable under the doctrine  
 of consideration. 
 The defendant’s promise was not gratuitous. 
 Therefore, the defendant’s promise is enforceable. 
 
 None of the defendants listed in the complaint will be  
 found guilty of fraud. 
 None of the shareholders of the corporation were listed as  
 defendants in the complaint. 
 Therefore, all of the shareholders will be found guilty of  
 fraud. 
 
 Some intentional conduct is not tortious. 
 Battery is tortious. 
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In the harsh light of the syllogistic form, some of these 
examples appear silly enough that they would not likely be 
advanced outside of logic textbooks and law review articles. 
However, they are illustrative of this fallacious pattern of 
argument, further revealed by reducing the arguments to 
symbols: 
 
No As are Bs. 
All Bs are Cs. 
Therefore, all As are Cs. 
 
or 
Some As are not Bs. 
All Bs are Cs. 
Therefore, all As are Cs. 
 
It is more likely that in practical legal argument, the Fallacy of 
Negative Premises takes a subtler, less formalistic, less 
syllogistic form. Whatever the form, the fallacy begins with a 
negative and ends with an affirmative. For example: 
 
 Since no federal court is vested with jurisdiction to hear  
 this lawsuit, jurisdiction must be vested in this state  
 court.161 
  
 Since the relationship between the lawyers did not have  
 the indicia of a general partnership, they must have been  
 engaged in an employment relationship. 
  
 
161. See Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers Union Local 802, 228 F. 
Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). In Tri-Boro Bagel, the court observed “[i]t is 
fallacious to reason from the negative. ‘No Court of the United States' is 
vested with power, to an affirmative that state courts must therefore be 
possessed of such authority. The technical name logicians assign to the 
paralogism is the fallacy of ‘false opposition’ or ‘false disjunction.’” Id. at 724 
n.11 (citation omitted). The case was cited as an example of the fallacy of the 
negative premise in Ruggero J. Aldisert’s Logic for Lawyers, A Guide to Clear 
Thinking. ALDISERT, supra note 57, at 2. 
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 Since the defendant was acquitted of first-degree murder,  
 he must be considered an innocent man. 
 
In each argument, the hallmark of the fallacy is reaching an 
affirmative conclusion based on a negative premise. Stated 
otherwise, the arguments attempt to argue for a classification 
based on what is not within the class. While these conclusions 
may be correct, they need some other argument to support 
them. One cannot compel a positive conclusion based on 
negative claims, any more than one can learn the best way to 
travel to a destination based on instructions on how not to get 
there. 
The import of spotting this type of fallacious argument is 
amplified when we consider our human attraction to the very 
element of such arguments that makes them necessarily 
unreliable: superficial heuristics. For example, consider this 
study of the psychological effect of a negative premise on a 
hearer’s persuasion. If your faith in the power of human 
reasoning leads you to expect that because it includes a false 
premise and a positive conclusion, people were more likely to 
reject the argument, you might find your faith challenged: 
 
In Experiment 1, participants were asked to 
choose the stronger of two arguments, one with a 
single positive premise and the identical 
argument with an additional negative premise. 
 
Shostakovich elicits alpha waves. 
Music of AC/DC does not. 
Bach elicits alpha waves. 
 
Shostakovich elicits alpha waves.  
Bach elicits alpha waves.162 
 
The experiment revealed that the participants were more likely 
to accept the argument that is based on a negative premise 
 
162. Heussen, supra note 10, at 1498. 
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than the argument without one.163 
 
V. Conclusion: Persuasive Reason, Superficial Heuristics, and 
the Practical Value of Logical Form 
 
The psychology of superficial heuristics, like “atmosphere 
effects”164 or “representativeness heuristic,”165 reminds us of 
our human tendency to avoid sound logic and gives us 
important reasons to think critically and intentionally about 
the logical form of legal argument. Of course, there are many 
other reasons. Ultimately, logical form is an important 
distinguishing characteristic of the process of legal reasoning. 
It is important because attention to logical form, the 
“architecture of argument,”166 is one method of avoiding 
capricious or prejudiced decision-making. Additionally, it is 
important because it helps legal thinkers avoid the 
consequences of bad judgments resulting from faulty 
heuristics. Understanding logical form is important because it 
provides a tool, a sort of metalanguage, for evaluating the 
logical characteristics of legal argument. Moreover, it is a tool 
that helps us distinguish logically sound legal reasoning from 
logically fallacious legal reasoning, which is important 
considering that fallacious arguments often sound valid, when 
in fact they are necessarily invalid. 
Because logically fallacious reasoning is a risk to sound 
reasoning, law students, lawyers, and judges would do well to 
think intentionally about logical form and to educate 
themselves regarding the hallmarks of fallacious reasoning. 
One simple tool in the pursuit of such an education is a basic 
understanding of the rules of logic and the formal logical 
fallacies that result from violation of those rules. One such rule 
is the Fallacy of Negative Premises, the subject of this Article. 
This Article cites more than 80 contemporary legal 
 
163. Id. at 1505 (concluding that the authors’ research in inductive 
reasoning “provides empirical evidence for the idea that negative evidence 
can increase argument strength”). 
164. See supra note 6. 
165. See supra note 12. 
166. See generally Raymond, supra note 25. 
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decisions utilizing formal logical fallacies to support or refute 
legal argument. The fallacies are the result of legal reasoning 
that fails to adhere to simple logical rules. It is important to 
realize that knowing even one rule of formal logic can yield 
significant results. One rule of logic states that negative 
premises cannot support affirmative conclusions. If an advocate 
attempts to justify his affirmative conclusion based on a 
negative premise, the argument fails, and the advocate must 
find some other justification for his claim. 
Moreover, the science of psychology might provide us with 
motivation to evaluate such an argument and to evaluate the 
faulty logic of an opposing legal argument first, rather than as 
a last resort. If legal decision-makers are predisposed to 
superficial heuristics, then they are predisposed to accept 
logically unsound, necessarily unreliable, legal arguments. 
This psychological predisposition to accept arguments that 
superficially “sound logical,” but are not, is an important 
vulnerability. Understanding logical form, learning the role of 
logic in legal decision-making and argument, and identifying 
logical fallacies (like the Fallacy of Negative Premises), are 
important but frequently ignored skills in evaluating sound 
legal argument and in using logic in the art of persuasion. 
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